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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Petitioner, :
v.

:

FOSTER M. LEONARD,

:

Case No- 900560-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Respondent. :
PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The issues presented in this petition for rehearing are
(1) whether this Court's apparent characterization of the
officers' "open view" observations as a "search" in need of
constitutional justification was erroneous, and (2) whether this
Court erroneously set forth the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement as an additional justification for the
warrantless search of defendant's vehicle.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Foster M. Leonard, was charged with two
counts of possession of a controlled substance (ephedrine and
hidrotic acid), second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37c-4(b) (Supp. 1991); possession of equipment with
intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991);
conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance,

(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990); and giving
false information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (Supp. 1991) (Record
[hereinafter R.] 12-13).
Following the trial court's denial of his motions to
suppress evidence, defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty
to the charges of possession of equipment with intent to
manufacture a controlled substance and conspiracy to manufacture
a controlled substance, as third degree felonies, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991) and Utah Code Ann. §§ 5837-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990) (R. 44, 51, 65, 113-21
(motions to suppress), 151-58 (statement of defendant), 108-12
(trial court's ruling)).
Defendant was subsequently sentenced to not more than
five years on each count and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine on each
count, sentences to run concurrently (R. 189-87).
On appeal, this Court affirmed defendant's conviction.
State v. Leonard, No. 900560-CA (Utah App. Dec. 5, 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement
of the facts is generally sufficient.

See State v. Leonard, No.

900560-CA, slip op. at 1-3 (Utah App. Dec. 5, 1991) (a copy of
the opinion is attached as Addendum A ) .
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The "open view" or "plain sight" observations of
investigating officers did not constitute a search in the
constitutional sense of that term and thus did not require
justification pursuant to any exception to the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment.

The subsequent entry into

defendant's vehicle for purposes of seizing contraband, however,
was justified by the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, which is the sole exception to that requirement
applicable here.

This Court's footnote to the main opinion,

setting forth the plain view doctrine as additional justification
for the warrantless search of or entry into defendant's vehicle
is erroneous as that doctrine has no application to the instant
facts.

Thus, due to the great potential for confusion by law

enforcement looking to this Court for guidance as to permissible
conduct in this sensitive area of the law, the State asks this
Court to modify footnote 11 and omit the erroneous and
superfluous dicta pertaining to the plain view doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court
has either "misapplied or overlooked [law] which materially
affects the result."

See Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-

73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913).

The argument portion of this brief

will demonstrate that the State's petition for rehearing is
properly before the Court and should be granted.

-3-

ARGUMENT
THE "OPEN VIEW" OBSERVATIONS OF INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SEARCH IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE OF THAT TERM AND THUS
DID NOT REQUIRE JUSTIFICATION PURSUANT TO ANY
EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT; MOREOVER, THE PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE IS NOT TRIGGERED BY THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE AND DOES NOT SERVE AS AN ADDITIONAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY OF
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE.
The State acknowledges that this Court affirmed
defendant's third degree felony convictions for possession of
equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, and
for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance.

See State

v. Leonard, No. 900560-CA, slip op. at 1 (Utah App. Dec. 5,
1991).

In so doing this Court upheld the warrantless search of

defendant's vehicle, correctly applying the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. .Id. at 1214.

Insofar as this Court's justification for the warrantless

search rests upon the automobile exception it is entirely proper;
however, in an extraneous footnote, this Court appears to
characterize the "open view" or "plain sight" observations of the
investigating officers as a warrantless search in the
constitutional sense of that term. .Id. at 14 n.11. As a result
of that characterization, this Court apparently attempts to
justify the officers' observations, as well as the subsequent
search of defendant's vehicle, under the plain view exception to
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. Jlci. It is
this, extraneous characterization and application of the plain
view exception which proves troubling to the State.
-4-

Thus, the issues presented in this petition are (1)
whether this Court's apparent characterization of the officers'
"open view" observations as a "search" in need of constitutional
justification was proper, and (2) whether this Court properly set
forth the plain view exception to the warrant requirement as an
additional justification for the warrantless search of
defendant's vehicle.

Due to the great potential for confusion by

law enforcement looking to this Court for guidance as to
permissible conduct in this sensitive area of the law, the State
asks this Court to modify its opinion and omit the erroneous and
superfluous dicta contained in footnote 11.
A.

Search.

At the outset of the State's analysis it is important
to clarify that the sole "search" issue raised by the instant
facts is the warrantless entry of defendant's vehicle.

Contrary

to the apparent reasoning of this Court, the "plain view"
observations of Officers Caldwell and Fox, through the windows of
defendant's vehicle, did not amount to a "search" in the
constitutional sense of that term.1

State v. Lee, 633 P. 2d 48,

50-51 (Utah), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981); State v.
Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983).
At this point in the State's analysis, it is helpful to
point out a critical distinction between the plain view exception
1

Specifically, this Court states that "none of the
officers testified that they actually conducted a search of
defendant's vehicle, only that they had seen the box containing
the Intertech purchase on the back seat." Leonard, slip op. at
14, n.ll.
-5-

to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment, to be
discussed in greater detail, supra, and the concept of "open
view" or "plain sight" discussed here.

"'Plain view' is the term

uniformly given to the doctrine invoked as justification for
seizing evidence without a warrant at the time of an arrest."
Lee, 633 P.2d at 51 n.l (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971)); Harris, 671 P.2d at 181 (noting that plain view
"never occurs until a lawful search (usually under a warrant) is
in progress").

Accord State v. Powell, 99 N.M. 381f 658 P.2d

456, 459-60 (N.M.App.), cert, denied, 99 N.M. 358, 658 P.2d 433
(N.M. 1983); State v. Bverlv, 635 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tenn. 1982),
abrogated on other grounds, Horton v. California,

U.S.

,

110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990); State v. Planz, 304 N.W.2d 74, 80 (N.D.
1981).

As such, the plain view exception "'authorizes seizure of

illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer' only if
the officer's 'access to the object' itself has a 'Fourth
Amendment justification.'"

La Fave, Search and Seizure, § 2.2(a)

p. 324 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S.
765 (1983)).
"'Open view' or 'plain sight,'" on the other hand, are
the non-search terms appropriately used to describe the lawful
observations of the investigating officers discussed here, and to
distinguish those observations from the plain view doctrine.
Lee, 633 P.2d at 50 n.l.2

"It has long been the law that

2

The Lee Court noted that considerable confusion may be
engendered, where, as may have happened in this case, the same
term is used to describe the two very different concepts. Id.
-6-

objects falling within the plain view of an officer from a
position where he is entitled to be are not the subject of an
unlawful search."

Lee, 633 P.2d at 50-51.

As acknowledged by

this Court, the initial investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle
was supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, Leonard, slip op. at 6; thus, the officers observations
were made from a position they were lawfully entitled to be.
Lee, 633 P.2d at 50-51.

Where, as here, an officer approaches a

legitimately stopped vehicle, "[he] is not expected to ignore
what is exposed to observation from a position where he is
lawfully entitled to be, and he may view the interior of a
vehicle from such a position."

Id..; Harris, 671 P. 2d at 179 ("It

is well established law that a government official does not
engage in a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if
he observes incriminating evidence from a place where he has a
right to be.").

Therefore, insofar as this Court appears to

characterize the officers' observations as a "search" needing
constitutional justification, that characterization is erroneous.
B.

Justification for Warrantless Entry.

Given the validity of the stop and the open view, nonsearch observations of the officers, it remains for the State to
justify the subsequent entry and seizure of contraband from
inside defendant's vehicle.

Contrary to the reasoning of this

Court, Leonard, slip op. at 14 n.ll, the officers' entry into

See also La Fave, Search and Seizure, § 2.2(a) pp. 323-25 (1987 &
Supp. 1991).
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defendant's vehicle cannot be justified solely by their
observations of contraband from outside the vehicle.

Although

the officers viewing was entirely proper and contributed toward
establishing probable cause for the subsequent vehicle search,
absent exigent circumstances, the officers were not authorized to
make a warrantless entry into defendant's vehicle (a
constitutionally protected area), for purposes of seizing
contraband.

Harris, 671 P.2d at 179; Lee, 633 P.2d at 50; State

v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 543 (Utah App. 1990).

As noted by the

Utah Supreme Court in Harris:
probable cause alone is never enough to
search for and seize contraband without a
warrant. If it were, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment would be rendered a nullity
and probable cause alone would make all
warrantless searches per se reasonable.
Absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless
entry to search for weapons or contraband is
unconstitutional, even when a felony has been
committed and there is probable cause to
believe that incriminating evidence will be
found within.
671 P.2d at 179 (citations omitted).
The instant warrantless search of defendant's vehicle,
i.e., the officers entry into the vehicle, was justified by the
exigent circumstances inherent in the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.

See La Fave, Search

and Seizure, § 7.5(a) pp. 128-29 (1987) (noting that the
warrantless search of vehicles on probable cause has been upheld
even absent true exigent circumstances under the automobile
exception).

Accordingly, the State argued the applicability of

the automobile exception in its responsive brief (a copy of which
-8-

is attached as Addendum B), and this Court correctly articulated
that exception as justification for the warrantless vehicle
search, holding in part as follows:
Thus, where as here, a vehicle is lawfully
stopped based on a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, a warrantless search is
justified where the officers have probable
cause to believe contraband is contained in
the vehicle. . . . Reviewing all of the
information available to the officers in the
present case, we hold that there was probable
cause to justify the search. Officers
Caldwell and Fox both testified that they
observed drug paraphernalia and chemicals in
plain view in the vehicle.
Leonard, slip op. at 13-14.
However, upon determining that the warrantless vehicle
search was justified by the automobile exception, this Court went
on to suggest that the testimony of Officers Fox and Caldwell
"raises an interesting question in that none of the officers
testified that they actually conducted a search of defendant's
vehicle, only that they had seen the box containing the Intertech
purchase on the back seat."

Id., at 14 n.ll.

This Court then

proceeded to observe that "a second exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is the plain view exception,"
and, relying on State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah App.
1989), asserted that that exception is properly applicable to the
instant facts:
Determining whether the plain view
exception applies requires application of a
three-pronged test: (1) the officer's
presence must be lawful; (2) the evidence
must be in plain view; and (3) the evidence
must clearly be incriminating.
-9-

It is clear that in the present case,
the officers' presence was lawful. We have
already established there was reasonable
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. It is
also clear from the record that the box
containing the glassware and chemicals was
clearly visible in the back seat of the
vehicle. As for the third prong, "clearly
incriminating" has been defined as "probable
cause to associate the property with criminal
activity." In this case, there is evidence
to suggest that the contents of the box were
associated with criminal activity because all
of the items purchased are used in the
manufacture of illegal substances, and are
rarely purchased in combination for any other
purpose. Thus, all of the requirements for
the plain view exception are satisfied.
Id. at 14 n.ll (citations omitted).

To the extent that footnote

11 suggests that the plain view exception somehow justifies the
officers entry into defendant's vehicle, it is erroneous and
reflects a basic misunderstanding of the plain view doctrine.
See Coolidae v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Lee, 633 P.2d
at 51, n.l; Harris, 671 P.2d at 179; Menke, 787 P.2d at 543.
As noted previously, the plain view exception is
primarily a seizure doctrine with exclusive reference
to the legal justification - the
reasonableness - for the seizure of evidence
which has not been particularly described in
a warrant and which is inadvertently3
spotted in the course of a constitutional
search already in progress or in the course
of an otherwise justifiable intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area. It has no
applicability when the vantage point from
which the 'plain view' is made is not within
a constitutionally protected area.
3

The United States Supreme Court recently held that
inadvertence is not a necessary condition of a legitimate plain
view seizure. Horton v. California,
U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 2301
(1990).
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State v. Scales, 13 Md.App. 474, 284 A.2d 45, 47 n.l
(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1971).

See also Lee, 633 P.2d at 51 n.l;

Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 181 (noting that plain view "never occurs
until a lawful search (usually under a warrant) is in progress").
Accord Powell, 658 P.2d at 459-60; Bverlv, 635 S.W.2d at 513;
Planz, 304 N.W.2d at 80. Thus, contrary to this Court's
assertion, Leonard, slip op. at 14 n.ll, the plain view exception
is inapplicable "until there has been a valid 'intrusion' into a
constitutionally protected area."

Planz, 305 N.W.2d at 80. It

is not, as suggested by this Court, a justification for the
initial intrusion. Jd.

Were it otherwise, law enforcement

officials could arguably use the plain view exception to
"bootstrap themselves into an exploratory search until they find
what they are looking for."

Harris, 671 P.2d at 181. The Harris

court further stressed that "'[ajny evidence will be in plain
view, at least at the moment of seizure.'" JEci. But, the "'plain
view' doctrine comes into play only where the observation made is
postintrusive.

Preintrusive observations merely give rise to

probable cause."

Id.

Thus, based on the foregoing analysis, the plain view
doctrine has no application in this case, nor was it properly
applied in Holmes, for its most basic requirement cannot be met
in either case.

Specifically, the presence of law enforcement

officers on the public highways outside the legitimately stopped
vehicles in Holmes, as well as this case, simply cannot be
characterized as an intrusion, lawful or otherwise, into a
-11-

constitutionally protected area, which intrusion is necessary to
trigger application of the plain view doctrine.

Harris, 671 P.2d

at 181. Thus, Holmes, because it application of the plain view
doctrine was incorrect, offers no valid support for this Court's
application of the plain view doctrine to the facts of this
case/
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should
modify its opinion and omit the erroneous and superfluous dicta
contained in footnote 11 thus limiting justification for the
warrantless search, i.e., entry into defendant's vehicle, solely
to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment.

Application of the plain view doctrine in this

case, as in Holmes, is erroneous and will serve only to confuse
law enforcement looking to this Court for guidance as to
permissible conduct in this sensitive area of the law.
The State certifies that this petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.

,

RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ffoay of December, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
M^IAITDECKER
^
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
4

The Court's erroneous reasoning in Holmes is perhaps
best explained by the fact that Holmes argued the application of
the plain view exception in her brief to this Court, asserting
that the contraband there was unlawfully seized pursuant to the
plain view exception because it was not clearly incriminating (a
copy of Holme's brief on appeal is attached as Addendum C ) .
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to Jay Fitt, attorney for appellant, 835 East 1400
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i
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OPINION
(For Publication)

S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 900560-CA

v.
Foster Leonard,
Defendant and Appellant,

FILED
(December 5, 1991]

Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable George E. Ballif
Attorneys:

Jay Fitt, Orem, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Russon.
JACKSON, Judge:
Defendant Foster Leonard appeals from his conviction for
possession of equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann,
§ 58-37C-8 (1990), and for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-4-201 (1990) and 58-37-8 (1990). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
From approximately May 1, 1989, to when the present facts
occurred, law enforcement agencies had been conducting
surveillance at Intertech Chemical in Orem, Utah. The
surveillance had resulted in several arrests and convictions
relating to the possession and manufacture of controlled
substances, specifically methamphetamine. On July 20, 1989,
Police Officer Terry Fox was conducting surveillance at
Intertech. He noticed defendant and April Garza in the parking
lot. Both were dressed in clothing "not typical of

business [people],•• and looked nervous. Defendant went into
Intertech and came out carrying a box of what appeared to be
glassware and chemicals. Defendant loaded the box into a Ford
Bronco, and drove away from the parking lot with Garza. Fox
decided to follow the vehicle in order to identify its owner.
As Fox proceeded out of the parking lot in his unmarked
vehicle, a Datsun truck swerved in front of him. Fox testified
that he thought the driver of the Datsun was trying to block him
from pursuing defendants vehicle. Fox continued to follow
defendant, who drove recklessly onto the freeway. Defendant's
vehicle accelerated to over seventy miles per hour and made
several illegal lane changes, according to Fox. Fox also
observed defendant putting bandanna-type flags out both windows
of the Bronco, apparently to signal the occupants of the Datsun.
Fox attempted to find out who owned the vehicle he was pursuing,
but the police dispatcher found no owner registered for the
license plates on defendant's vehicle. The Datsun similarly had
no registered owner.
Fox testified that he decided to stop defendant for the
traffic violations he had witnessed. Thinking that he might be
in danger, Fox called for assistance. Three other police
officers eventually assisted Fox in stopping defendant. One of
those, Detective Gary Caldwell, learned from Intertech that
defendant and his companion had purchased glassware and a
chemical. None of the items purchased were controlled
substances, but all were commonly used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. Caldwell testified that he made the decision to
stop the vehicle based on his belief that defendant was in
possession of drug paraphernalia and controlled substances.
When defendant's vehicle was pulled over, the officers had
defendant and Garza get out of the vehicle and kneel down on the
side of the freeway. Under Caldwell's direction, Officer Sean
Greening placed Garza in his vehicle and asked her name, address,
and birthdate. Garza produced an Oregon driver's license.
Greening testified that he also advised Garza she did not have to
answer his questions. Garza asked why she was being stopped, to
which Greening replied "for possession of drug paraphernalia."
Garza then explained to Greening that someone had paid her and
defendant to purchase the items, and that they were to deliver
the items to a motel room.
Meanwhile, Caldwell asked defendant for a driver's license
and vehicle registration. Defendant had no identification and
told Caldwell the vehicle belonged to Garza. Defendant then gave
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Caldwell the name "Scott Leonard" and a birthdate which was later
determined to be false• Caldwell testified he advised defendant
of his constitutional rights and defendant consented to answering
some questions. Caldwell then proceeded to question defendant as
to what he was doing in Utah County. Defendant told Caldwell
that he had come to Utah County to purchase the items for
someone, and that he could not tell Caldwell who that was,
because defendant would get in trouble. Caldwell also testified
that he could see a box in the back of the Bronco, and that the
box contained the items Intertech had told him defendant had
purchased.
Because the stories given by defendant and Garza were
different, and because he knew what items defendant had purchased
at Intertech, Caldwell arrested defendant and Garza. Defendant
and Garza were transported to the American Fork Police Department
and both were questioned by Caldwell. Eventually Caldwell
determined the exact address of the apartment which defendant and
Garza shared, and a search warrant of the premises was obtained,
based on Caldwell's affidavit.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the
warrantless search of the Bronco and in the warrant search of his
apartment, claiming that the officers did not have probable cause
to initiate the stop of his vehicle. The trial court denied his
motion. Defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty
pursuant to this court's decision in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 93 5,
938 (Utah App. 1988), and this appeal followed.
Before this court, defendant appeals the denial of his
motion to suppress, claiming that the evidence was illegally
obtained. Specifically, defendant claims that his arrest was not
based on probable cause; that the search of the Bronco was not
based on probable cause; and that the search of his residence was
tainted by the illegality of the arrest.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of findings of fact underlying a trial court's
decision on a motion to suppress is governed by the "clearly
erroneous" standard, State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133, 133 (Utah
App. 1991), because the trial court is in an advantageous
position to determine the factual basis underlying such a motion.
"The trial court's finding is clearly erroneous only if it is
against the clear weight of the evidence . . . ." State v. Serv,
758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah App. 1988).
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LEGALITY OF THE INITIAL STOP
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that all seizures of an individual be based on probable
cause.1 The United States Supreme Court first explicitly
permitted a seizure of an individual upon less than probable
cause in Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). The
Terrv Court held that a police officer must be able to point to
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion." 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. The reasonable
suspicion standard is codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15
(1990):
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
"Stressing that each case must be decided upon its own facts, the
Terrv court concluded that the limited stop and frisk was
justified where *a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his [or her]
experience that criminal activity is afoot . . • .'" State v.
Serv, 758 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Terrv. 392 U.S.
at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884). Thus, a temporary detention or
seizure is justified when there is an articulable suspicion that

1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, with our emphasis:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
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an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime.2 See
id. (quoting Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S. Ct.
1319, 1324 (1983) (plurality opinion)). This court has further
refined the Terry reasonable suspicion test, concluding that a
"brief investigatory stop must be based on xobjective facts' that
the * individual is involved in criminal activity.'" State v.
Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted).
The State argues that several facts support the conclusion
that the officers in the present case had a reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity was afoot, and that therefore the stop of
defendant was justified. Intertech had been under surveillance
for selling drug paraphernalia; defendant's behavior was
suspiciously inconsistent with that of a legitimate businessman;
defendant purchased several items from Intertech which are
commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine; defendant
2.
Of course, no suspicion is required when a police officer
merely makes an inquiry of an individual in the context of a
wholly voluntary encounter. The Utah Supreme Court has
determined that there are three levels of police-citizen
encounters, each of which requires a different degree of
justification to be constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop";
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the
officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)
(quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.
1984)). "The stopping of a vehicle and the consequent detention
of its occupants constitute a level two xseizure' within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, even if the purpose of the stop
is limited and the resulting detention brief." State v. Steward,
806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988)). In our case, it is not disputed
that a level two stop occurred.
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left Intertech in an unregistered vehicle; some person in a
Datsun tried to prevent the officers from pursuing defendant;
defendant displayed bandannas from the windows of his vehicle in
an apparent attempt to signal the occupants of the Datsun; and
defendant drove erratically and illegally on the freeway,
apparently engaging in evasive tactics.3
We agree that there was an articulable suspicion which
justified the stop of defendant's vehicle, and that therefore the
level two seizure of defendant was reasonable.4 While defendant
contends that the officers had no evidence that a crime had been
committed, we note that the officers were not only entitled, but
probably required, to obtain more information when they
reasonably suspected a crime had been committed. See State v.
Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971,
98 S. Ct. 523 (1977); Holmes. 774 P.2d at 508. We hold,
therefore, that defendant was constitutionally stopped and
briefly detained, and that the trial court's determination that
the requisite reasonable suspicion existed was not clearly
erroneous.
ARREST OF DEFENDANT AND SEARCH OF VEHICLE
Having determined that the initial seizure of defendant was
lawful, we must determine if the subsequent arrest and search
were lawful. Defendant argues that the police officers lacked
probable cause to arrest him, or to conduct a warrantless search
of the vehicle in which he was riding. The trial court found
that the arrest of defendant was based on probable cause because
the chemicals and equipment found in the vehicle were commonly
3. The State also lists as support for the contention that the
stop of defendant was based on a reasonable suspicion, several
facts which occurred after defendant had been stopped. Of
course, only facts known to the officers at the time they stopped
defendants vehicle are relevant. See State v. Baird, 763 P.2d
1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988). See also State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d
181, 183 (Utah 1987).
4. While Fox testified that he originally planned to stop
defendant for traffic violations, it is clear from the record that
Caldwell, who took charge of the situation once he was contacted by
Fox, stopped defendant's vehicle for the purpose of ascertaining
who defendant was, and for what purpose the glassware and chemicals
had been purchased from Intertech.
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used together in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and because
testimony revealed that only one specialized piece of glassware
and some chemicals were lacking to make the illegal substance.
As to the search of defendant's vehicle,5 the trial court found
that there was probable cause based on the list of items
purchased from Intertech received while the officers were in
pursuit, the suspicious behavior of defendant, and "all attendant
circumstances."6 However, the court's ruling does not indicate
which exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment it was relying upon in justifying the warrantless
search.
The Arrest
As to the legality of the arrest, Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2
(1990) provides authority for peace officers to make an arrest
with or without a warrant. Reasonable cause for arrest without a
warrant was defined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259 (1972): "The
determination should be made on an objective standard: whether
5. We refer to the vehicle which defendant was driving as
"defendant's vehicle," but we note that the vehicle actually
belonged to passenger Garza.
6. The State does not argue that defendant, because he was not
the owner of the vehicle, has no standing to challenge the search
of the vehicle. Therefore, we do not reach the question of
whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
vehicle.
Prior to State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), our
supreme court never required the issue of standing to be raised
by the parties in the trial court or on appeal. "Standing is an
issue that a court can raise sua sponte at any time." State v.
Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990). Rather, that court reached the
issue regardless of whether or not a party had raised it. See
State v. Constantino. 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (per
curiam); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984); State
v, Purcell. 586 P.2d 441, 443 (Utah 1978). In Schlosser.
however, the court held that standing to challenge the validity
of a search is not a jurisdictional doctrine, and, as such, that
issue is waived if not raised before the trial court by the
parties. Schlosser. 774 P.2d at 1138-39. But see Schlosser, 791
P.2d at 1139-41 (Howe, J., dissenting) (two justices would sua
sponte raise issue of standing).
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from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences which
fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person
in his position would be justified in believing that the suspect
had committed the offense." Id. at 1260 (citations omitted).
See also State v. Avala. 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App.), cert.
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
The arresting officer, Caldwell, testified that he
questioned defendant regarding his presence in Utah County and
the purchase from Intertech. Only after defendant gave a false
name and birthdate, could provide no plausible explanation for
the purchase, and would not tell Caldwell who had paid him to
make the purchase, did Caldwell effectuate an arrest.
These facts, taken together with the evasive tactics engaged
in by defendant when the officers were pursuing him, the fact
that the officers knew exactly what defendant had purchased from
Intertech based on the list of items received while in pursuit,
and the fact that the items found in defendant's vehicle were
commonly used together in the manufacture of methamphetamine,
warranted arresting defendant. Accordingly, we cannot say that
the trial court's finding of probable cause was an erroneous one.
The dissent takes issue with the tactics employed by the
officers in effectuating a level two stop, concluding that a de
facto arrest actually occurred. Admittedly, if defendant had
been arrested immediately upon being stopped by the officers,
probable cause would have to be established at that point, and
not after Caldwell interviewed defendant. While many courts have
addressed the issue of when a seizure occurs,7 the cases are less
clear on when an arrest occurs. The United States Supreme Court
has acknowledged that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish an
investigative stop from a de facto arrest. See United States v.
Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). There
7. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen
may we conclude that a seizure has occurred. Terrv v. Ohio, 3 92
U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968). See also Immigration and
Naturalization Serv. v. Delaado. 466 U.S. 210, 216-17, 104 S. Ct.
1758, 1763 (1984) (intimidating circumstances surrounding police
questioning result in Fourth Amendment seizure); United states v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980)
(person is seized when, "in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave").

900560-CA

8

is no "litmus-paper test for . . . determining when a seizure
exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop[,]H Florida v. Rover.
460 U.S. 491, 506, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1329 (1983), and becomes an
arrest. Rather, the determination usually depends upon the
reasonableness of the stop under the circumstances. Two factors,
whether there was a proper basis for the stop, and whether the
degree of intrusion was reasonably related to the facts and
circumstances at hand, are determinative of reasonableness.
Terrv. 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79; United States v.
Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479
U.S. 1097, 107 S. Ct. 1318 (1987). While the dissent does not
dispute there was a reasonable basis for the stop, it does take
issue with tactics employed by the officers. In reaching our
conclusion that a proper level two stop was effectuated in this
case, a review of cases which have addressed this question is
useful to illustrate that no arrest took place.
The dissent is correct in acknowledging one exception to the
general proscription against intrusive police conduct: police
are permitted to use a show of force or other exceptional methods
during a Terry stop when such measures are reasonably necessary
for the protection and safety of the investigating officers. The
mere use or display of force in making a stop will not
necessarily convert a stop into an arrest. United States v.
Greene, 783 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 476 U.S.
1185, 106 S. Ct. 2923 (1986); United States v. White. 648 F.2d
29, 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied. 454 U.S. 924, 102 S. Ct. 424
(1981). See also Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct.
1921, 1923 (1972) (police officers making a reasonable
investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to
protect themselves from possible attack); United States v. Lego,
855 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1988) (officer can point a gun at
suspect without transforming investigative stop into arrest);
United States v. Trullo. 809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir.) (because
"officer suspected appellant of dealing in narcotics, a pattern
of criminal conduct rife with deadly weapons," display of weapon
justified), cert, denied. 482 U.S. 916, 107 S. Ct. 3191 (1987);
United States v. Eisenbura. 807 F.2d 1446, 1451 (8th Cir. 1986)
(experienced police officers acted reasonably in drawing weapons
in investigative stop of suspected narcotics dealer).
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We recognize that the officers' conduct, ordering defendant
8
to kneel at the side of the road, was intrusive.
If weapons
^
were drawn, the conduct is even more intrusi ^.
Certainly such
conduct would not be warranted if the surrounding circumstances
did not give rise to a justifiable fear for personal safety.
United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 1986).
However in this case, there was justification. While the dissent
acknowledges that certain situations merit officers approaching a
suspect with their weapons drawn, or ordering a suspect to lie on
the ground, the dissent argues that in this case, such actions
were not warranted because the police never determined whether
defendant had a weapon, and there was no indication that
defendant was dangerous. However, that conclusion is based on
faulty assumptions.

8. Focusing on whether or not requiring a driver to step out of
his or her vehicle exceeds the scope of a Terry stop, the Supreme
Court has concluded that '• [w]hat is at most a mere inconvenience
cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the
officer's safety." Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.
Ct. 330 (1977). See also United States v. Leao. 855 F.2d 542,
545 (8th Cir. 1988) (officer's confining suspect in police car
within scope of investigative stop); United States v. Manbeck,
744 F.2d 360, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding reasonableness of
investigative stop where police ordered the suspect to take a
seat in the police car), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 1217, 105 S. Ct.
1197 (1985). Also, as the dissent points out, police may require
a suspect to lie on the ground. See, e.g.. United States v.
Buffincrton. 815 F.2d 1292, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987).
9. There is nothing in the record that supports the dissent's
conclusion that defendant was not violent or armed. In fact,
quite the opposite can be assumed given the facts recited above.
On similar facts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it
was reasonable to assume that a suspected narcotics dealer was
armed and dangerous. United States v. Salas. 879 F.2d 530, 535
(9th Cir.) (erratic and evasive driving by defendants and reports
of drug materials in defendants' motel room gave police
reasonable suspicion that defendants were armed), cert, denied,
493 U.S. 979, 110 S. Ct. 507 (1989); see also United States v.
Post, 607 F.2d 347, 851 (9th Cir. 1979) (,f[i]t is not
unreasonable to assume that a dealer in narcotics might be
armed").
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First, the record does not indicate whether or not defendant
was frisked. Two of the officers who testified gave different
accounts of what transpired after defendant's vehicle was
stopped.
Second, the record does indicate that the officers thought
defendant was dangerous and could be carrying a weapon. Officer
Fox testified that he became fearful when bandannas were put
outside the windows of defendant's car. He decided to call for
back-up officers to stop defendant's car when the bandannas
appeared, and when he saw the cream-colored Datsun following him.
"I felt it was a chase car, an assistance car," Fox testified,
"and I was again fearful that I needed to have enough help to
stop this vehicle so I wouldn't get hurt." In addition, Fox
stated that when he sees an unregistered vehicle, he immediately
gives it more caution. Officer Greening, who also testified at
the suppression hearing, stated that he was called to assist in a
stop for drug paraphernalia, and that he has been informed in
past circumstances that "these people could be dangerous, and
thats why [he] was there to assist." Greening went on to say
that officers, including himself, were often called to assist on
DUI's and regular traffic stops, and "whenever an officer may
feel he is in danger," and that it was his belief in dealing with
people who were involved with drugs that "[t]hey have been
convicted criminals and in the possession of firearms." We find
abundant support in the record that the officers believed
defendant could be armed or dangerous, and not, as the dissent
suggests, that the police had nothing more than a hunch that
defendant might be dangerous. Therefore, the officers' actions
were not unreasonable to insure their safety.
The dissent points to defendant being read his Miranda
rights as further indication that an arrest took place. In
Berkemer v. McCartv, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984), the
Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings were not required when a
defendant is subjected to questioning during a routine traffic
stop. The Court pointed to the circumstances around a traffic
stop and compared them to stationhouse interrogation, "which
frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware
that questioning will continue until he provides his
interrogators the answers they seek." Id. at 448, 104 S. Ct. at
3149 (citations omitted)• Given that traffic stops occur in
public, and that they are relatively brief, the Court concluded
that "persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not
*in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." Id. at 440, 104 S.
Ct. at 3150. The Court, however, also noted that police "could
ensure compliance with the law by giving the full Miranda
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warnings." Id. at 431 n.13, 104 S. Ct at 3145-46 n.13.10 That
is exactly what took place here.
In the present case, defendant was detained briefly on the
side of the highway. The officers interrogated defendant.
Defendant was arrested after he gave the officers false
information, and had no plausible explanation for the Intertech
purchase. Given the circumstances facing the officers, we
conclude that they pursued their investigation in a diligent and
reasonable manner, and that the methods employed were not
excessive.
The Search
Admittedly, the search of defendant's vehicle conducted
without a warrant is unreasonable per se unless it falls within a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See State v.
Bartlev. 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App. 1989). The State,
acknowledging that the trial court did not rely upon a specific
exception, claims that the search was justified pursuant to the
automobile exception.
While an individual has a lesser expectation of privacy in a
vehicle as opposed to in his or her home, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment still applies. See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d
1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citing California v. Carney. 471 U.S.
390-93, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068-70 (1985)). In Carroll v. United
States. 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925), the Supreme Court
determined that a warrantless search of an automobile was
10. In United States v. Bautista. 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982),
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while officers are
not required to give Miranda warnings every time they question a
suspect, "Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terrv stop
if the suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning
takes place in a police dominated or compelling atmosphere.11 Id.
at 1291 (citing United States v. Wilson. 666 F.2d 1241, 1247 (9th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Harris. 611 F.2d 170, 172 (6th Cir.
1979)); United States v. Hickman. 523 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir.
1975), cert, denied. 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S. Ct. 778 (1976).
Compare United States v. Baron. 860 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1988)
(police exceeded scope of investigative stop by ordering
defendant not to touch anything or say anything, and thirty-five
minutes later confined her to a small room for questioning),
cert, denied. 490 U.S. 1040, 109 S. Ct. 1944 (1989).
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permissible if the officers have probable cause to believe the
automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a crime and
that they may be lost if not immediately seized. Ici. at 151-52;
see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07, 102 S. Ct.
2157 (1982); Chambers v. Maronev. 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975,
1978-80 (1970); United States v. Mendoza. 722 F.2d 96, 100 (5th
Cir. 1983); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Utah 1986);
State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984); State v.
Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Carroll.
267 U.S. at 132); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 512 n.6 (Utah
App. 1989). Thus, where as here, a vehicle is lawfully stopped
based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a
warrantless search is justified where the officers have probable
cause to believe contraband is contained in the vehicle.
"The determination of whether probable cause exists . . •
depends upon an examination of all the information available to
the searching officer in light of the circumstances as they
existed at the time the search was made." State v. Dorsev. 731
P.2d at 1088 (citing Brineaar v. United States. 338 U.S. 160,
176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949)). Probable cause for a
warrantless search has been found to exist on facts similar to
those in the present case. In Mendoja, drug enforcement agents
conducted surveillance of a residence, and also followed
individuals who had contact with the suspect who resided there.
The agents observed several of these individuals driving "in a
manner calculated to elude surveillance," Mendoza, 722 F.2d at
101, using pay telephones, and making several trips to and from a
warehouse. While the court said that these facts may be
consistent with innocent behavior, the totality of the
circumstances justified a warrantless search of the suspects'
vehicles. Id. at 101-02.
Similarly, in Dorsev, our supreme court upheld a warrantless
search of an automobile where a police officer who was assisting
other officers involved in an undercover narcotics purchase,
followed defendant's truck and eventually stopped him. The court
found that because the officer knew that a controlled narcotics
purchase had been attempted; that two of the individuals had left
the motel room where the negotiations were taking place; that
someone involved in the transaction had on a dark leather jacket;
and that defendant was wearing a dark leather jacket, probable
cause existed. Dorsev, 731 P.2d at 1089.
Reviewing all of the information available to the officers
in the present case, we hold that there was probable cause to
justify the search. Officers Caldwell and Fox both testified
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that they observed drug paraphernalia and chemicals in plain view
in the vehicle.11 The officers also testified that defendant
could not explain why he purchased the items, or for whom they
were purchased. While the officers' information at the time of
the search might not be sufficient by itself to establish guilt,
it was sufficient to establish probable cause. See id.
Therefore, the trial court's determination that probable cause
existed for the search was not erroneous.
VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
Defendant's last claim is that the affidavit in support of
the warrant to search his apartment contained nothing from which
a detached and neutral magistrate could conclude that the
apartment contained evidence of a crime. It is well established
that a finding of "probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation" is required for the issuance of a search warrant.
State v. Brown. 798 P.2d 284, 285 (Utah App. 1990) (citation
11. This testimony raises an interesting question in that none
of the officers testified that they actually conducted a search
of defendcint's vehicle, only that they had seen the box
containing the Intertech purchase on the back seat. Although not
briefed or raised by the State, a second exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is the plain view exception.
Determining whether the plain view exception applies requires
application of a three-pronged test: (1) the officer's presence
must be lawful; (2) the evidence must be in plain view; and (3)
the evidence must clearly be incriminating. State v. Holmes, 774
P.2d 506, 510 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted).
It is clear that in the present case, the officers' presence
was lawful. We have already established there was reasonable
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. It is also clear from the
record that the box containing the glassware and chemicals was
clearly visible in the back seat of the vehicle. As for the
third prong, "clearly incriminating" has been defined as
"probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity." State v. Kellv, 718 P.2d 385, 390 (Utah 1986)
(quoting Texas v. Brown. 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S. Ct. 1535,
1543 (1983) (plurality opinion)). In this case, there is
evidence to suggest that the contents of the box were associated
with criminal activity because all of the items purchased are
used in the manufacture of illegal substances, and are rarely
purchased in combination for any other purpose. Thus, all of the
requirements for the plain view exception are satisfied.
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omitted). In reviewing a probable cause determination, a
magistrate's decision will be upheld if "the magistrate had a
substantial basis for . . . [determining] that probable cause
existed," State v, Babbell. 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2332 (1983)).
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the affidavit in this
case is sufficient. Taken as a whole, the affidavit establishes
that the affiant relied on his own and upon Fox's investigation
and observations of defendant's conduct; that defendant had
purchased several items which were known to be used in the
manufacture of methamphetamine; that defendant gave false
information as to where he resided, and when questioned about the
Intertech purchase; and that Garza, with whom defendant shared
the apartment, and who was arrested at the same time based upon
the same facts as defendant, had previously been convicted for
conspiracy to manufacture and distribute illegal substances. See
State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989) (probable
cause determination supported by fact that defendant has
previously been convicted of similar offense), cert, denied, 795
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). These facts, taken together, support the
trial court's determination that probable cause existed for the
issuance of the search warrant.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the stop and subsequent warrantless search of
defendant's vehicle, defendant's arrest, and the warrant search
of defendant's home did not violate his rights, and therefore,
the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence found as a result of those searches was not clearly
erroneous. The conviction is affirmed.

RUSSON, Judge (concurring in the result):
I concur in the result of the main opinion, but write
separately because I prefer a different analytical approach to
reach the same result. I would hold that probable cause to
arrest Leonard existed at the time at which the officers stopped

900560-CA

15

Leonard's vehicle. The facts which support probable cause
include: (1) evidence that the continuing surveillance had
resulted in several arrests and convictions relating to the
possession and manufacture of methamphetamine; (2) Officer Fox's
observation that Leonard's dress and manner were suspiciously
inconsistent with those of a legimate businessman; (3) the Datsun
truck's attempt to block Officer Fox from following Leonard;
(4) Leonard's evasive driving manner, including driving at
excessive speeds and making numerous illegal lane changes;
(5) Leonard's apparent attempt to signal the occupants of the
Datsun truck by waving bandanna-type flags out the window;
(6) Officer Fox's discovery that no owner was registered for the
license plates on the vehicle that Leonard was driving; and
(7) the fact that Officer Caldwell had learned from Intertech
what items had been purchased by Leonard and his companion, in
concert with Officer Caldwell's knowledge that the said items are
commonly used in the manufacture of methampetamine. On the basis
of these facts, I would hold that the officers had probable cause
to arrest Leonard when they stopped his vehicle, and that
therefore the trial court properly denied Leonard's motion to
suppress. Accordingly, I agree that Leonard's conviction should
be affirmed.

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

ORMEr Judge (dissenting):
In its brief, the State does not contend that there was
probable cause to arrest defendant or subject him to anything
more intrusive than a level-two Terry stop at the time the police
officers effected the stop and asked their initial questions.
Accordingly, the debate on appeal was principally directed to
whether the police officers possessed the articulable suspicion
necessary to justify a level-two encounter. I agree the officers
had the requisite articulable suspicion to warrant a level-two
stop. It does not follow, however, that what the officers
actually effected was a proper level-two stop. Given the
intrusive tactics employed by the investigating officers, I
believe the main opinion errs in determining that the initial
seizure was a level-two stop and not a de facto arrest requiring
probable cause.

900560-CA

16

According to the record, the police officers stopped
defendant because they suspected him of committing a non-violent
felony—possession of equipment used in the manufacture of
controlled substances. There were four police officers present,
and three police cars, while only defendant and his female
companion occupied the stopped vehicle. The stop occurred along
the shoulder of a well-traveled highway, apparently during
daylight.1 At no time prior to the stop had the officers seen
defendant or his companion in possession of a weapon, and the
record provides no indication that the police had anything more
than a pre-stop hunch that defendant might be dangerous. When
defendant's vehicle came to a halt on the shoulder of the
highway, defendant voluntarily exited the vehicle and walked
toward the police cars. There is no evidence that defendant made
furtive gestures, carried himself suspiciously, or otherwise
approached the police in anything but a cooperative, non-violent
manner.2
Nonetheless, Officer Fox testified that before questioning
defendant, he ordered defendant to kneel down at the side of the
highway. The female occupant of defendant's vehicle was placed
in one of the police cars. Further, although neither Officer Fox
nor Officer Caldwell recalled specifically whether any of the
police officers drew their guns at the time they made the stop,
Officer Fox claimed it was "very possible" guns were drawn, and
Officer Caldwell stated that he "hoped" at least one of the
officers had drawn his gun. Finally, Officer Fox testified that
before questioning defendant, Officer Caldwell advised defendant
of his Miranda rights.
A Terrv stop "involves no more than a brief stop,
interrogation, and, under the proper circumstances, a brief check
for weapons." United States v. Robertson. 833 F.2d 777, 780 (9th
1. Although the record does not state the time of the stop,
other facts—i.e., that, just prior to the stop, officers had
been conducting surveillance at a wholesale establishment open
for business, and that officers clearly saw bandannas being waved
from defendant's vehicle—indicate that the stop took place
during daylight hours.
2. It would thus appear that any pre-stop concern the officers
had about the potential dangerousness of defendant would have
been largely dispelled by his non-confrontational approach. Any
lingering concern could have been dispelled by a simple pat down
of the sort permitted by Terry.
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Cir. 1987). Anything beyond such a brief and narrowly-defined
intrusion constitutes a de facto arrest, and probable cause is
required. See id.; Dunaway v. New York. 442 U.S. 200, 99
S. Ct. 2248, 2254 (1979). The accepted rule is that what might
have otherwise been a level-two stop evolves into a level-three
de facto arrest when, in view of all the circumstances, a
reasonable, innocent person in the suspects place would believe
himself to be under arrest. See United States v. Pinion, 8 00
F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 936, 107 S.
Ct. 1580 (1987). See also Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 502,
103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326-27 (1983) (characterizing relevant inquiry
as whether the suspect believed he was being detained).
Accordingly, in the course of a valid Terry stop the police may
not, as a matter of routine, utilize methods which might commonly
be employed incident to arrest. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 9.2(d) at 366 (2d ed. 1987).
There is, however, one exception to this general
proscription against intrusive police conduct. Police are
permitted to employ a show of force or other exceptional methods
during a Terrv stop when such measures are reasonably necessary
for the protection and safety of the investigating officers.3
3. For situations in which police officers may draw weapons
while effecting a stop, see, e.g.. United States v. Jones, 759
F.2d 633, 638-39 (8th Cir.) (drawing weapons is permissible part
of vehicle stop "if the police action is reasonable under the
circumstances," taking into consideration "the number of officers
and police cars involved, the nature of the crime and whether
there is reason to believe the suspect might be armed, the
strength of the officers' articulable, objective suspicions, the
erratic behavior of or suspicious movements by the persons under
observation, and the need for immediate action by the
officers . . . . " ) , cert, denied. 474 U.S. 837, 106 S. Ct. 113
(1985); United States v. Narcri. 732 F.2d 1102, 1106 (2d Cir.
1984) (display of weapons does not transform stop into arrest
when suspected crime is a serious felony and stop was made in an
isolated area); United States v. Jacobs. 715 F.2d 1343, 1345-46
(9th Cir. 1983) (drawing weapon acceptable when vehicle's
occupant is suspected of bank robbery and is possibly under the
influence of drugs, and the police officer is alone).
For situations in which police officers may require a
suspect to lay down on the ground, see, e.g.. United States v.
Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (when suspect ran
toward apartment for which police had a warrant to search for
guns and drugs, and suspect put his hand into his pants, it was
acceptable for police to force suspect to lie on the floor),
cert, denied. 110 S. Ct. 1790 (1990); United States v. Tavlor,
(continued...)
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However, even then, the investigating officers must employ the
least intrusive means reasonably available to effect the purpose
of the stop. See Royer, 103 S. Ct. at 1325 (recognizing that,
although permissible level of intrusion will vary with
circumstances, least intrusive means must always be employed).
I agree that, in the instant case, the State has set forth
sufficient facts to support a finding that the police had
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and make a level-two
inquiry. However, given the circumstances of the encounter, I do
not believe those same facts support a finding that the intrusive
methods used by the police were necessary to protect the officers
during the stop.4 The State has provided no additional evidence
to justify the officers' conduct.5 Therefore, on the record
before us, I believe the seizure to have been too intrusive to
qualify as a level-two stop.6
3 (...continued)
716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1983) (stop not invalid because
police ordered suspect to lie on the floor, when suspect had
disobeyed police commands to raise his hands and had made furtive
gestures); People v. Chestnut. 51 N.Y.2d 14, 409 N.E.2d 958, 962,
431 N.Y.S.2d 485 (ordering suspect to the floor was permissible
when suspect was in company of man whom there was probable cause
to arrest for an armed robbery that had just been committed, and
police had witnessed a suspicious exchange between that man and
the suspect), cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1018, 101 S. Ct. 582 (1980).
4.
The officers did not frisk defendant, or otherwise attempt
to discern if he was carrying a weapon. This strongly suggests
that, once defendant had been stopped and exited his car, the
officers did not suspect he was armed. Robertson. 833 F.2d at
781. Other circumstances of the stop—the highway-side locale,
the presence of four officers, the non-violent nature of the
suspected offense, and defendant's non-furtive attempt to
approach the police vehicles—also indicate the situation was not
potentially dangerous, and that intrusive tactics were
inappropriate.
5. The problem may essentially be a failure by the State, at the
trial court, to develop the available evidence so as to meet its
burden of proof. Little attention seems to have been given at
the evidentiary hearing to what the police did in effecting the
stop as opposed to what they knew in deciding to effect the stop.
6. Nonetheless, I might still be willing to view the facts as
not moving the case from the level-two to the level-three
pigeonhole if, at the time the seizure occurred, a reasonable,
(continued...)
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It is the State's burden to show that the seizure it seeks
to justify was sufficiently limited to satisfy the conditions of
a level-two stop. United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 781
(8th Cir. 1983) (quoting Rover. 103 S. Ct. at 1325-26). See
United States v. Al-Azzawy. 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert, denied. 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S. Ct. 2255 (1986). For the
reasons discussed above, I believe the State falls short of
satisfying that burden. See also note 4, supra. Accordingly, I
would hold that the district court erred in determining defendant

6(...continued)
innocent person in defendant's place would not have believed
himself to be under arrest. See United States v. Pinion. 800
F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 936, 107 S.
Ct. 1580 (1987). I find such a possibility unlikely here. The
police converged on defendant in three separate cars. The
initial confrontation was somewhat hostile despite defendant's
passivity, and may well have included a show of weapons by one or
more officers. Defendant was ordered to his knees at the side of
the highway, while his female companion was placed in the back of
a police vehicle. Defendant was then informed of his Miranda
rights. It is unlikely that, at this point in the encounter, a
reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his
seizure to be less than a level-three custodial one. Other cases
have reached the same result in similar circumstances. See,
e.g. , United States v. Delqadillo-Velascruez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1295
(9th Cir. 1988) (Terrv-stop of suspected drug dealers held
invalid when police approached with guns drawn, ordered the
suspects to lie down in the street, and handcuffed them, since
the "show of force and detention used in this context are
indistinguishable from police conduct in an arrest"); Kraus v.
County of Pierce, 793 F.2d 1105, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1986) (under
circumstances in which police turned spotlights on the suspects,
drew their weapons, and ordered the suspects to drop to their
knees, a reasonable person would have believed himself to be
under arrest), cert, denied. 480 U.S. 932, 107 S. Ct. 1571
(1987).
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was subjected to a valid level-two stop, reverse the denial of
defendant's suppression motion,7 and remand with instructions to
permit withdrawal of his guilty plea.

Gregory^R. Orme, Judge

7. The evidence seized from the car and from defendant's home is
tainted by the illegality of his "arrest" on less than probable
cause. Probable cause came into existence only when defendant
made incriminating statements when in custody, but such custody
was improper where it was supported by nothing more than an
articulable suspicion.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 900560-CA
Priority No. 2

v.
FOSTER M. LEONARD,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of
equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8
(Supp. 1991), and for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-4-201 (1990) and 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the
grounds that the investigatory stop of defendants' vehicle was
supported by reasonable suspicion, that the subsequent search of
defendants' vehicle was proper, that officers provided
appropriate Miranda warnings prior to questioning defendants and
that the affidavit in support of a search warrant for defendants'
residence was sufficient to establish probable cause.

Because

the trial court is in the best position to assess witness
credibility in a motion to suppress hearing, this Court "will not
disturb its factual assessment underlying a decision to . . .
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly appears that the
lower court was in error,"
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)-

State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285

A trial court's findings are not clearly

erroneous unless they are either against the clear weight of the
evidence, or this Court reaches a "definite and firm conviction"
that the trial court was mistaken.

State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537,

539 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted); State v. Ashe, 745
P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).

However, this Court reviews

conclusions drawn from the trial court's fact findings as a
matter of law, giving no deference to the lower court's ruling.
State v. Caver, No. 900297-CA, slip op. at 7 (Utah Ct. App. June
25, 1991).
When a search warrant is challenged as having been
issued without an adequate showing of probable cause, the
reviewing court does not conduct a de novo review of the
magistrate's probable cause determination; instead, the reviewing
court determines only whether the magistrate had a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed.
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989).

State v.

The reviewing court

should pay "great deference" to the magistrate's decision.

-2-

Ibid.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Foster M. Leonard, was charged with two
counts of possession of a controlled substance, to wit, ephedrine
and hydriodic acid, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37c-4(b) (Supp. 1991); possession of equipment
with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991);
conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, to wit,
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990) and giving false
information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (Supp. 1991) (Record
[hereinafter R.] at 12-13).
Following the trial court's denial of his motions to
suppress evidence, defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty
to the charges of possession of equipment with intent to
manufacture a controlled substance and conspiracy to manufacture
a controlled substance, as third degree felonies, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991) and Utah Code Ann. §§ 5837-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990) (R. at 44, 51, 65, 113-21
(motions to suppress), 151-58 (statement of defendant), 108-12
(trial court's ruling)).
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Defendant was subsequently sentenced to not more than
five years on each count and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine on each
count, sentences to run concurrently (R. at 189-87).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For purposes of the issues raised on appeal, the
pertinent facts are those set out in the trial court's ruling (R.
at 108-112).x

The Court's findings of fact and conclusions of

law are as follows:
[1] From approximately May 1, 1989, law
enforcement agencies had been conducting
surveillance at Intertech Chemical in Orem[,]
Utah. The surveillance has resulted in a
number of arrests and convictions. On July
20, 1989, Detective Terry Fox was conducting
surveillance at Intertech. He noticed
defendant Leonard in the parking lot wearing
casual clothes and using what appeared to be
a personal vehicle rather than a company
vehicle. Leonard behaved in a nervous
manner. He purchased what looked to the
detective to be glassware and chemicals and
appeared to pay in cash. Defendants loaded
the glassware and chemicals in to the vehicle
and left the parking lot.
[2] Detective Fox decided to follow the
vehicle in order to identify its owner. As
Fox attempted to follow the vehicle, another
car swerved in front of Fox in an apparent
attempt to disrupt his progress. It appeared
to Fox that the defendants' vehicle was
trying to evade pursuit. Fox noted reckless
behavior on the part of the defendants as
they turned to get on the freeway that nearly
caused an accident. On the freeway, the
defendants' accelerated to over 70 miles per
hour in a 55 miles per hour zone.

1

Defendant does not appear to dispute the trial court's
findings; rather, defendant challenges the credibility of the
officers who testified at the motion to suppress hearing (Br. of
App. at 5-6).
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[3] Detective Fox called for back up after a
check through dispatch found no owner
registered for either the plates of the
defendants' vehicle nor for the vehicle that
swerved in front of him. The vehicle was
stopped without incident after the backup
arrived,2 The officers on the scene then
arrested the defendants and gave the
appropriate Miranda warnings. Defendants
were interviewed separately concerning what
they had purchased and the purpose for which
they had purchased it. They gave the
officers different stories—but both
indicated that they were purchasing the
equipment for someone else. Defendant
Leonard at first gave a false identification
and date of birth. Over $2,000 was found in
defendant Garza's purse.
[4] Prior to the arrest of the defendants
and the search of the vehicle, the officers
had made contact with Intertech and were told
what the defendants had purchased*3 The
items found in the vehicle—including
glassware and chemicals—matched the
description of the merchandise given by
Intertech. The vehicle contained items
frequently used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. Defendant Garza gave two
different addresses as her own. After
checking with Mountain Bell, the officers
found that one of the addresses given had a
phone listed in her name. Based upon the
information given above, a search warrant was
2

Based on information provided him by Officer Fox, Officer
Gary Caldwell of the American Fork Police Department effected the
stop of the defendants' vehicle (T. at 82-90). The stop was
based on the officers' belief that defendants were in possession
of drug paraphernalia, as well as controlled substances (T. at
53, 56-58, 61, 89-90).
3

Although the trial court correctly found that Intertech
was contacted prior to defendant's arrest, a review of Officer
Caldwell's testimony at the suppression hearing makes clear that
the arresting officers received the Intertech information even
prior to the stop of defendants' vehicle (T. at 33). In
addition, Officer Caldwell learned that defendants paid cash and
did not provide Intertech with their names at the time of
purchase (R. at 7, para. #8; a copy of Officer's Caldwell's
affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum A)•
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served on defendant Garza's residence.
Numerous "listed" chemicals and drug
paraphernalia were found.
[5] The Court finds that the stop made by
the officers was appropriate and legal.
Detective Fox had reasonable suspicion based
on the circumstances taken as a whole. The
defendants did not appear to be ordinary
businessmen; they appeared to be nervous;
they drove erratically, they used what
appeared to be a personal vehicle; another
car seemed to be acting in concert with
defendants in an attempt to block the
detective's pursuit; dispatch could not
identify owner of the vehicle from the
license plate number; the defendants were
traveling more than 15 miles per hour in
excess of the speed limit; the list of items
purchased given to the officers while in
pursuit were indicative of illegal activity.
All of these factors taken together could
easily create a reasonable and articulateble
[sic] suspicion necessary to make an
investigatory stop.
[6] Defendants were properly given their
Miranda warnings. Even before the officers
began investigatory questioning which does
not require it, defendants were given Miranda
warnings. Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d
1168, 1170 (1983).
[7] The Court believes the search of the
defendant's vehicle was proper. The list of
items purchased from Intertech received while
the officers were in pursuit, combined with
the suspicious behavior of the defendants,
and all attendant circumstances, created
probable cause for [the] search of the
vehicle. Even if the search was improper,
the illegality would not affect the legality
of the search warrant. The reasoning of the
Court is that information relative to the
evidence found in the vehicle was available
to the officers in the form of a purchase
order from Intertech.
[8] The chemicals and equipment found in the
defendants' vehicle and on the purchase order
from Intertech were commonly used together in
the making of methamphetamine. In fact
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testimony indicated that the materials found
lacked only one specialized piece of
glassware and some other chemicals to allow
one to easily make methamphetamine. Also,
such equipment is rarely used in conjunction
to make anything other than methamphetamine.
The officers, being aware of the facts above,
had probable cause to make the arrest.
[9] The Court believes that there was
sufficient probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrant based on the conduct of
the defendants and the purchase order from
Intertech. This probable cause was enhanced
by the statements of the defendants relative
to the intended use of the supplies obtained
from Intertech and the false information
given relative to living quarters and
identity.
[10] For the reasons given above, the Court
finds that the stop of the defendants'
vehicle, the subsequent questioning of the
defendants, and the issuance of the search
warrant were proper. Therefore, the Court
denies defendants['] motion to suppress.
(R. at 108-12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's arguments in points I-III of his brief
appear to focus on the trial court's assessment of reasonable
suspicion for the initial stop of defendant's Bronco (Br. of App.
at

10-13).

Specifically, defendant broadly asserts that the

stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and therefore the
subsequent arrest, seizure of contraband, investigatory
questioning and warrant-based search of his residence were all
impermissibly tainted (Br. of App. at 10-13).

Defendant's

unsubstantiated and erroneous allegations lack merit as well as
record support.
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The stop of defendant's vehicle was supported by a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity•

Prior to

the stop, investigating officers had observed defendant's and his
companion's suspicious conduct, including the cash purchase of
glassware and chemicals commonly used in the illegal manufacture
of methamphetamine, as well as defendants' evasive and reckless
driving.

Notwithstanding the above, defendant challenges the

subsequent search of the Bronco and police questioning solely on
the alleged illegality of the initial stop.

However, because the

initial stop of defendant's vehicle was valid as based on
reasonable suspicion, defendant's arguments are all equally
without merit.
As for defendant's allegations concerning the
sufficiency of Officer Caldwell's affidavit, a review of the
record supports the magistrate's finding of probable cause for
the issuance of the search warrant.

Contrary to defendant's

assertion, the affidavit clearly identified the "source" of
Officer Caldwell's information which included his and other
officers' observations of defendant in possession of drug
paraphernalia.

Moreover, because a police officer is generally

presumed to be reliable, no special showing of the officers'
reliability is required.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED BY POLICE
WAS PROPER.
In point I of his brief on appeal, defendant challenges
the trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion in
support of the investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle (Br, of
App. at 5).

Specifically, defendant asserts that the trial court

erred in relying on the testimony of the officers in assessing
the facts in support of its determination of reasonable suspicion
for the stop (Br. of App. at 6-7, 10). Defendant further alleges
that certain of the trial court's findings were erroneous, and
that viewing the facts individually, they fail to support the
trial court's ruling (Br. of App. at 6-9). Defendant's
unsubstantiated and erroneous allegations are without merit.
Due to the trial court's "advantageous position in
determining the factual basis for a motion to suppress," as well
as to "observe witnesses' demeanor and other factors bearing on
credibility," this Court will not upset a trial court's
underlying factual findings unless they appear to be clearly
erroneous.

State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah Ct. App.

1990) (citations omitted); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258
(Utah 1987).

A trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous

unless they are either against the clear weight of the evidence,
or this Court reaches a "definite and firm conviction" that the
trial court was mistaken. .Id., (citations omitted).
-9-

Accordingly,

this Court may not disturb the trial court's determination that
reasonable suspicion existed unless that factual finding is
clearly erroneous.

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah

1987); (Utah 1987); State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 137 n.l (Utah
Ct. App. 1991); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).

But see State v. Carter, No. 900303-CA, slip op. at

n.6 (Utah Ct. App. May 28, 1991) (amended opinion) (noting the
Court's confusion on the proper standard of review - i.e.,
whether to treat the trial court's determination of the existence
of reasonable suspicion as a question of fact or a conclusion of
law)/
The "reasonable suspicion" test was first articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).

There the Court held that when "a police officer

observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity is afoot," he
may make an investigative stop to confirm or dispel his

A

The State acknowledges that Utah is in the minority with
Mendoza's requirement that the reasonable suspicion determination
be reviewed as a finding of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez - Alvarado, 891
F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) (setting forth the generally held
view that whether reasonable suspicion exists is a mixed question
of fact and law, and the trial court's ultimate conclusion
regarding reasonable suspicion is a legal conclusion which is
reviewed do novo). In Carter the State plans to seek certiorari
review by the Utah Supreme Court and to ask that court for
clarification of the standard of review for reasonable suspicion
determinations. However, unless and until the Utah Supreme Court
disavows Mendoza, that decision and its clearly erroneous
standard of review are binding on this Court.
-10-

suspicion.

Ld. at 30.5 A police officer who makes an

investigative stop must be able to point to "specific and
articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."

Ld. at 21.

The Terry "reasonable suspicion" test has been codified in Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) which reads as follows:
Any peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address, and an explanation of his actions.
This Court has interpreted the reasonable suspicion
test and concluded that a "brief investigatory stop must be based
on 'objective facts' that the 'individual is involved in criminal
activity.'"

State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct. App.

1989) (citations omitted); Menke, 787 P.2d at 541.

5

This Court has previously noted that there are three
constitutionally permissible levels of police encounters:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd
on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991).
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The undisputed testimony of the officers at the motion
to suppress hearing established that members of the North End
Narcotics Strike Team were conducting an ongoing investigation
into the establishment and operation of methamphetamine
laboratories (T. at 9-13, 27, 46, 64-65)•

As part of that

investigation, Officer Fox was conducting a visual surveillance
of Intertech Trading in Orem, Utah on July 20, 1989 when he
observed defendant and codefendant, April Garza, purchase
glassware and chemicals (T. at 10-12, 32). Officer Fox believed
defendant's behavior was suspiciously inconsistent with the
actions of a legitimate businessman for several reasons,
including defendant's casual dress and the absence of a company
logo on the Bronco, as well as defendant's continuous scanning of
the parking lot before lifting up the front of his shirt and
reaching down his pants to remove something (T. at 10-12, 27-29).
While Officer Fox watched, boxes depicting glass flasks (which
appeared to be the same size and shape as glassware boxes Officer
Fox had observed during previous investigations), as well as
gallon containers of some type of chemical, were loaded into the
back of the Bronco (T. at 11-13).
As the Bronco, driven by defendant, pulled out of the
Intertech parking lot, Officer Fox attempted to get the license
plate number of the vehicle (T. at 13). As he attempted to
follow defendant's Bronco, Officer Fox was intercepted by a cream
colored Datsun parked against traffic on the wrong side of the
road (T. at 13). After forcing Officer Fox to brake in order to
-12-

avoid hitting it, the Datsun fell in behind the Bronco, in front
of Officer Fox's vehicle (T. at 14). Upon reaching the 1-15
northbound on-ramp, Officer Fox observed the Bronco fail to yield
the right of way to another vehicle, forcing the other vehicle
off the road into the barrow pit (T. at 14).

At the same time,

the Datsun slammed on its brakes and began weaving an S-pattern
in front of Officer Fox's vehicle (T. at 14). As he continued
following the Bronco northbound on 1-15, Officer Fox observed
several additional evasive tactics by defendant including
speeding and illegal lane changes (T. at 15-17).

He also

observed defendant apparently attempt to signal the Datsun by
putting bandanna-type flags out both windows of the Bronco (T. at
16).

A subsequent registration check on both the Bronco and

Datsun prior to the stop revealed that neither set of plates were
"on file" (T. at 15).
Officer Caldwell, who had been called for back-up
assistance, then contacted Intertech in an effort to determine
what defendant and his companion had purchased (T. at 33, 96).
Intertech informed Officer Caldwell what they had purchased, that
they paid cash and that they had not given their names at the
time of purchase (R. at 7, para. #8; see Addendum A ) .

Based on

information received from Intertech, as well as the personal
observations of Officer Fox and defendant's reckless, evasive
driving, Officer Caldwell stopped defendant's vehicle (T. at 3538, 53, 61, 66). As he approached to talk to defendant, Officer
Caldwell observed heating panels, heating units, glassware,
-13-

stirring rods, boxes of rubber gloves and color blast testing
strips in plain view in the Bronco (T. at 69). Due to his
experience in the investigation of controlled substances and
their manufacture, Officer Caldwell was able to identify these
objects as the type commonly used in the unlawful manufacture of
methamphetamine (T. at 69-71).
Based on the foregoing, the stop of defendant's Bronco
was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

As

has been recognized by this Court, trained police officers "may
be able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which
would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer. . . . "
Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. Thus, an officer is "entitled to assess
the facts in light of his experience."

.Id. (citations omitted).

Moreover, contrary to defendant's apparent assertion, an
officer's assessment of reasonable suspicion depends not on
isolated facts, but upon the totality of the circumstances.
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Because the investigating officers in this case were able to
articulate their suspicions and identify the facts upon which
they were based, and because those suspicions were justified by
the totality of the circumstances confronting the officers, this
Court should affirm that the stop of defendant's vehicle was
lawful.

The court's reasonable suspicion determination was not

clearly erroneous.

Id.
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POINT II
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPER
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
As previously noted, defendant's arguments in points
II-III concerning the subsequent search of the Bronco and police
questioning, appear to be nothing more than an extenuation of his
argument in point I, without sufficient factual development (Br,
of App. at 10-11).

Defendant appears to assert that the officers

lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant
and his companion were engaged in illegal activity prior to
stopping the Bronco; therefore, the subsequent vehicle search, as
well as police questioning, were allegedly invalid and any
contraband seized, or information gained therefrom, should be
suppressed pursuant to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).

As before, defendant's broad and unsubstantiated

allegations are without merit.
The trial court found that there was probable cause for
the search of defendant's Bronco.

Specifically, the Court

stated:
The Court believes the search of the
defendants' vehicle was proper. The list of
items purchased from Intertech received while
the officers were in pursuit, combined with
the suspicious behavior of the defendants,
and all attendant circumstances, created
probable cause for [sic] search of the
vehicle.
(R. at 111, para. # 7 ) . Although the trial court determined that
the search of defendant's vehicle was supported by probable
cause, the court's ruling does not expressly state which
-15-

exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment it
was applying.

Admittedly, a search and seizure conducted without

a warrant is unreasonable per se unless it falls within a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

State v.

Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation
omitted); Menke, 787 P.2d at 543. However, the search of
defendant's vehicle was justified under the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement first articulated in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1925).

The Carroll Court

determined that a warrantless search of an automobile was
permissable if the searching officers "have probable cause to
believe that the automobile contains either contraband or
evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if not immediately
seized."

State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App.

1989) (quoting State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah
1984)).

See Chambers v. Maronev, 399 U.S. 42 (1975).

See also

California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087-88
(Utah 1986).6

Thus, where as here, a vehicle is lawfully

stopped based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and
6

Because defendant has neither raised nor requested a
separate state constitutional analysis under article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution, the State's argument is based solely
on the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and
thus; does not address the plurality opinion in State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) which held that under article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution, warrantless searches are permissible
"only where they satisfy their traditional justification, namely,
to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent the
destruction of evidence." Id. at 469-70.
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officers observe contraband which may be lost if not immediately
seized, the Carroll doctrine would justify an immediate and
warrantless search.
1978).

State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah

See Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411.

See also State v.

Hvqh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985).
Reviewing all the information available to the officers
in light of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the
search, the evidence shows that the officers had ample
information available to establish probable cause that there was
contraband in the vehicle and to justify an immediate warrantless
search of the Bronco.
Officers Caldwell and Fox testified that they observed
drug paraphernalia and chemicals in plain view in the back of
defendant's Bronco at the time of the stop (T. at 19, 69).
Specifically, Officer Fox testified that he observed gallon
containers and glass flasks of chemical in an open box in the
back of the Bronco (T. at 19). Officer Caldwell testified that
he observed glassware, heating panels and units, stirring rods,
color blast testing strips and rubber gloves (T. at 69).

These

observations, together with the suspicious behavior of defendant
and his companion at the time they purchased the glassware and
chemicals, the information from Intertech concerning the
purchased items, as well as defendant's evasive and reckless
driving prior to the stop, all support the trial court's apparent
determination that there was probable cause to associate the drug
paraphernalia and chemicals observed in the Bronco with the
-17-

suspected illegal manufacture of methamphetamine.

See Menke, 7 87

P.2d at 544 (contraband seized was the anticipated fruit of the
suspected theft).

Thus, in summary, defendant was lawfully

stopped and investigated, probable cause existed for the search
of the Bronco, and the warrantless search was justified under the
automobile exception.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in

denying defendant's motion to suppress and this Court should
affirm the lower court's ruling on this ground.

See State v.

Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) (Court may affirm trial
court's decision to admit evidence on any proper ground).
As for defendant's allegation in point III, he vaguely
asserts that information obtained through police questioning was
tainted and therefore "inadmissable" because it followed the
alleged illegal stop of defendant's Bronco (Br. of App. at 11).
Significantly, defendant does not attack the trial court's
findings in regard to the propriety of police questioning
following his arrest.

The trial court specifically held that

[t]he officers on the scene [] arrested the
defendants and gave the appropriate Miranda
warnings. Defendants were interviewed
separately concerning what they had purchased
and the purpose for which they had purchased
it. They gave the officers different
stories—but both indicated that they were
purchasing the equipment for someone else.
. . .

Defendants were properly given their
Miranda warnings. Even before the officers
began investigatory questioning which does
not require it, defendants were given Miranda
warnings.
(R. at 109, 111, supra pp. 5-7 para. ## 3, 6).
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As previously noted in point 1, it is the State's
position that the stop of defendant's Bronco was valid pursuant
to the officers' reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; thus,
subsequent events were not tainted thereby.

Because defendant

has not presented additional argument, legal analysis, authority
or record support for his allegations, the State will not further
address defendant's argument on this point. Moreover,
defendant's minimal and conclusory analysis does not merit review
by this Court.

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah

1984); State v. Sterqer, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (court declined to rule on defendant's arguments due in
part to his failure to provide any meaningful analysis).
POINT III
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S
RESIDENCE.
In point IV of his brief defendant appears to assert
that Officer Caldwell's affidavit in support of a search warrant
for defendant's residence was insufficient to establish probable
cause (Br. of App. at 11-12).

Specifically, defendant asserts

that •• [n]othing contained in either the affidavit or in the
transcript of the hearing reveals any claim to a source, whether
confidential or otherwise, which claims to have seen any
contraband or other evidence of criminal conduct" (Br. of App. at
13).

Defendant's meritless allegations are unsupported by the

record•
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It is well established that a finding of "probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation" is required for the
issuance of a search warrant.

State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285

(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).

It is equally clear

that whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant
established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
is determined by the totality of the circumstances.

State v.

Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d
1258 (Utah 1983) (adopting Gates analysis)), cert, denied, 773
P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).

In determining whether the issuing

magistrate reached a practical, common sense decision that there
is "probable cause to believe that evidence is located in a
particular place," the reviewing court does not conduct a "de
novo probable-cause determination;" rather, the reviewing court
determines whether the evidence viewed as a whole" provides a
"'substantial basis' for the finding of probable cause."

Ld. at

1109-10 (citing Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-733
(1984)); Brown, 798 P.2d at 286 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230,
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987), and State v.
Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).

In so

determining, the reviewing court should pay "great deference to
the magistrate's decision."
(Utah 1989).

State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991

A review of Officer Caldwell's affidavit

accordingly reveals a "substantial basis" for the magistrate's
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determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant for defendant's residence.
As previously noted, defendant's primary challenge to
the affidavit appears to be that it failed to identify a "source"
for the information contained therein (Br. of App. at 13).
However, contrary to defendant's assertion, the "source" of
Officer Caldwell's information was clearly stated in the
affidavit (R. at 70-72, see Addendum A).

Specifically, Officer

Caldwell relied upon his own and Officer Fox's investigation and
observations of defendant's conduct (R. at 70-72, see Addendum
A). 7

As set forth in the affidavit, Officer Fox observed

defendant and his companion load drug paraphernalia into their
vehicle at Intertech (R. at 72, see Addendum A ) .

He then relayed

that information to Officer Caldwell in a request for backup
assistance, who then contacted Intertech to find out what
defendant had purchased (R. at 71-72, see Addendum A ) .

Based on

the information he received from Intertech, as well as
defendant's reckless and evasive driving, Officer Caldwell
determined that defendants had purchased prohibited drug
paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture the controlled
substances (R. at 71, see Addendum A ) .
7

Because a police officer is generally presumed to be
reliable, no special showing of either Officer Caldwell's or
Officer Fox's reliability is required here. 3 W. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 3.5(a), p. 3 (1987) (citing United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)). Cf. State v. Miller, 740 P.2d
1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App.) (average neighbor witness is not the
type of informant in need of independent proof of reliability or
veracity) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah
1987).
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As further stated in his affidavit, Officer Caldwell
subsequently interviewed both defendant and his companion and
received conflicting stories concerning an individual who
allegedly asked them to purchase the paraphernalia on his behalf
(R. at 70-71, see Addendum A)•

Officer Caldwell also ran a

criminal history on codefendant Garza and learned that she had
previously been arrested for conspiracy to manufacture
methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute and possess
methamphetamine.

See State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah

Ct. App.) (probable cause determination supported by information
that defendant had previously been convicted of a similar
offense), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).

Based on the

foregoing information, Officer Caldwell determined that defendant
and his companion were "not being honest" with him and that,
contrary to their assertions, they were in fact themselves
manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine in their residence
and that a search of that residence would reveal additional
paraphernalia (R. at 70, see Addendum A).

Thus, contrary to

defendant's assertion, Officer Caldwell's affidavit provided a
substantial basis for the magistrate's determination of probable
cause to believe that contraband would be discovered inside
defendant's residence.

Therefore, this Court should affirm the

trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress on this
ground•
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial
court denying defendant's motion to suppress should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j[p

day of July, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General /

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Jay
Fitt, attorney for appellant, 835 East 1400 South, Orem^-JJtah
84058, this / f f S a y of July, 1991.
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ADDENDUM A

CIRCUIT CPMST, AMERICAN FORK DEPART."~*IT
OTAH COU17TY, STATE OF DTAH
*************************************************************

PROBAELE CAUSE
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF AND MOTION FOR A
SEARCH WARRANT

STATE OF UTAH,

-vsOCCUPANTS OF • 56&Q Soti^h
1291 E a s t
Mu;

CASE NO.

************************ *************«*>************* *******

STATE OF UTAH,

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

j

1. Gary Caldwell
oath/ deposes and says;
2.
3.

f

being first duly sworn on

That I am a police officer for American Fork Police
Departr.entf American Forkf Utah, Utah Countyf State
of Ut;h.
That I have been a police officer for the past ten years.
I have been working with a narcotics task force as a
supervisor for the past two years. I have experience in
serving as many as 100 search warrants during the past eight
years. I have arrested many people for narcotics violations
during the same period of time

4.

I have been to narcotics training classes during the past
two years to train me in working with different types of
narcotics cases. One of the classes dealt with methamphetimines
and how people operate labs. I have been trained in all
aspects of the operation of and the way people operate in
order to set a lab up.

5.

In the past three months I have had experience in arresting
as many as twelve persons who have been involved in manufacturing
methamphetimine labs. I have found and located meth labs
in houses and vehicles. I have seen the equipment used and
the method of operation.

6.

On July 20th, 1989 at 1400 hours, Lt. Fox of the American
Fork Police Department observed a blue 1980 Bronco with Utah
Plates # 023 DAD pick up items from Intertech Trading in
Orem, Utah at 170 South Mtn. Way Dr. The itmes he could see
being loaded appeared to be paraphrenlia items used in a
methamphetimine* lab. Lt. Fox contacted your affiant at the
American Fork Police Dept. and told me what he had seen. He
was asked to follow the vehicle until I could determine who
the person picking the itmes up was.

I was able to determine that the items picked up were items
listed on the House Bill # 3 as paraphrenlia items. I believe
that based on the actions of the two suspects in the vehicle
and the items purchased by cash from Intertech Trading that
the two persons knew that the items were going or were probably
going to a meth lab.
The actions were that the two suspects hid the itmes in the
rear of the vehicle they were driving. They did not gine any
names at the time of purchase. They picked up items listed
on House Bill #3 and other items we believe are used to manu
facture meth. They had some one other than the registered
owner drive the vehicle.
At approximately 1400 hours, your affiant stopped the suspect
vehicle and advised the driver of his rights. He told your affiar
that he was paid to come to Orem by a man he knows as "Fatso"
and pick up the paraphrenlia items. He told me that he
was to take the items to Salt Lake Cith to a motel, rent a
room and call the guy at a pay phone booth and he would come
pick up the chemicals and glass ware, he told me that he was
given $540.00 cash to pay for the items.
Your affiant interviewed the female suspect at the American
Fork Police Department and she told your affiant that she
met a man in a business in Salt Lake City two months ago.
She told me that the man she knows as Mike Shriver is
from California and he gave-her $2,000.00 in cash to go to
Orem to pick the chemicals and paraphrenlia items up. She
said they were to take the items to Salt Lake to a Motel
and rent it for three days and put the key on top of the
pay phone outside.The suspect was to call her at her house
and she would tell him where the key was and he would pick
the items up.
Your affiant believes that there is probable cause to believe
that both suspects were in possession of drug paraphrenlia
with intent to manufacture Methamphetamines. Your affiant
ran a criminal history on April Garza and found that
she has been in prison in California and possible Oregon. I
found that she had family in Oregon. I learned that she has
been arrested for Conspiracy to Manufacture Methamphetamines
Conspracy to Dist. and Poss Methamphetamines . She also
has a arrest for assault on a police officer with a firearm.
Your affiant interviewed April and Leonard, the two suspects
and both of them gave your affiant an address in Salt Lake
City. April gave your affiant this address also and said she
lived here too. I asked her which address she really lived at
and she gave me the 5600 South 1291 East #6. I was able to
have her give me her phone number. She stated the number was
the number registered to the stated address. I called Mary
at Mtn. Bell and she told me that the phone number given to
your affiant was registered to April at 5600 South 1291 East
#6 in MurrayfUtah

7
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Your affiant sent Det. Blackhurst and Det. Taylor from Orem
Police to Murray: to the stated address, and they located
a 280 Z car which is registered to April. The car is parked
right in front of the stated residence. Your affiant was
told by Blackhurst that the mail box in front ofthe residence
had the name of April and Leonard on it.

14.

Your affiant believes that the two listed suspects have not
been honest with me and that they in fact may the ones
making or manufacturing or distributing methamphetannines. That
they in fact live at the stated address at 5600 South 1291 East
#6.

15.

Your affiant believes that the two suspects are or may be
in possession of controlled substances in the residence which
have been manufactured by glass ware and items the same as
we seized. Your affiant believes that the two suspects will
be in possession of items used to distribute or manufacture
controlled substances, and that they will be in possession
of items used to identify them and their sources for the
sale or distribution of controlled substances.

16.

Your affiant believes that because of the evidence found
already and the criminal history of April and because of
the type of items involved in the use and manufacturing of
methamphetimines that there is a serious danger to the officers
serving the search warrant. April is not in the house, but
in the Utah County Jail, however, anyone could be in the stated
residence.

17.

Therefore, Your affiant respectfully request a warrant to
search the stated residence and to enter the residence without
first giving notice of our presence and intent to enter.

Jl/-M^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS ^O
TIME: iS'-lif

DAY OF JULY 1989.

CIRCUIT .fibtfltt JUDGE

~~

ADDENDUM C

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

vs.

Plaintiff/Respondent

:
:

CHARLENE ANN HOLMES

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 880168-CA
Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction imposed for
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1953 as
amended) in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge,
presiding.
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Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the officers' detention of Ms. Holmes violate the

fourth amendment to the United States Constitution?
2.

Did the officers1 detention of Ms. Holmes violate

article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution?
3.

Even if the officers lawfully stopped the vehicle in

which Ms. Holmes was a passenger, did they nevertheless violate the
fourth amendment in seizing the roll of paper towels and its
contents since the facts did not fit within the plain view exception?

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
vi.

be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides:
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop
and question suspect — Grounds. A peace
officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe
he has committed or is in the act of committing
or is attempting to commit a public offense and
may demand his name, address and an explanation
of his actions.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code
Ann.§78-2a-3(2) (f), whereby the defendant in a district court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final judgment of conviction for any crime other than a first degree
or capital felony.

vii.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH/

:

vs.

Plaintiff/Respondent

:
:

CHARLENE ANN HOLMES

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 880168-CA
Category No. 2

:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ^
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Attempted Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance/ a class A
misdemeanor/ in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8 (1953 as amended).

The

judge found Ms. Holmes guilty on January 15, 1988/ on the basis of
evidence received during a hearing on a Motion to Suppress Evidence
held November 20/ 1987/ in the Third Judicial District Court/ in and
for the Salt Lake County# State of Utah/ the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, presiding.

See Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of September 17/ 1987/ Lieutenant William
Gray and Sergeant William A. Shelton of the Salt Lake City Police
Department were on a plainclothes assignment patrolling in an
unmarked police car (T 26).

At approximately 8:30 p.m., Sgt. Shelton and Lt. Gray
first noted a woman as she stood on the sidewalk on the west side of
1200 South State Street talking to the male occupant of a pickup
truck.

Officers Gray and Shelton, in their unmarked car, pulled in

behind the truck which then drove away.

The woman, whom the

officers later learned was Charlene Ann Holmes, proceeded to walk
southbound (T. 5, 26-27).
As Ms. Holmes continued walking south, Officers Gray and
Shelton observed a car pull into the Veterinary Hospital parking
lot, stopping at the entrance crossing the sidewalk.
turned and talked to the driver.

Ms. Holmes

After a short conversation, the

car departed and Ms. Holmes continued walking south before crossing
the street at the southwest corner of 1300 South and State Street.
She proceeded to walk south to a service station, Wayne's Car Care
Center (T. 6-7, 27).
At Wayne's Car Care Center, the officers observed a male
in a small pickup truck stop and briefly converse with Ms. Holmes.
Ms. Holmes then walked south and as she neared the southern end of
the service station, the second of the three cars which the officers
had earlier seen stop Ms. Holmes pulled into the station.

The

driver again conversed with Ms. Holmes and shortly thereafter she
got into the car (T. 7-8).
The officers followed the car as it headed southbound on
State Street.

At 1700 South, the car turned east and entered the

west parking lot at South High School.
-2 -

The car exited only seconds

later on to 1700 South and proceeded eastbound to 300 East, entering
the east parking lot at South High School.
later and returned to 1700 South.

The car emerged moments

Driving westbound, the car turned

at 200 East, made a U-turn and reentered 1700 South westbound to
State Street.

The car then turned north onto State Street (T. 9-10,

28-29).
At approximately 1500 South and State Street, Lt. Gray
and Sgt. Shelton pulled the car over.

Prior to stopping the car,

neither officer had viewed Ms. Holmes engage in any illegal activity
nor did they observe the driver of the car violate any traffic
ordinances (T. 10, 29).
Sgt. Shelton testified that he and Lieutenant Gray
stopped the car because they figured that a prostitution deal had
been made between the driver of the car and Ms. Holmes.

Sergeant

Shelton speculated that the deal had been made, but that the
occupants of the car had discovered that he and Lt. Gray were police
officers and were thus returning to State Street to drop off Ms.
Holmes (T. 10,29).
Sgt. Shelton, as head of the vice squad, had had no
previous contacts with Ms. Holmes and had no information that she
was a prostitute (T. 17). He testified that his belief that a
prostitution deal had been made was based on his observations that
there is a very high area of prostitution between approximately 800
South and 2100 South on State Street (T. 5-6), that Ms* Holmes
strolled at a very low pace, turning back and looking toward
-3 -

traffic, that she had brief conversations with three different males
(T. 21), and, that the route the car had taken was suspicious (T.
10).
After stopping the car, Sgt. Shelton approached the
driver's side of the car and asked the driver to step out and talk
to him (T. 11).

Sergeant Shelton did not take the driver's name,

nor did he note or record the model and make of the car or its
license plate number (T. 24).
Lt. Gray walked up and stood directly behind the car door
on the passenger side where Ms. Holmes was seated (T. 30). Lt. Gray
testified that from his vantage point, he witnessed Ms. Holmes
remove a roll of paper towels from her purse and attempt to stuff
them between the car console and the seat.

Lt. Gray opened the door

and asked Ms. Holmes for the roll of towels.

He reached in and

removed the towels and unrolled them on the roof of the car.

He

stated the towels contained two syringes, a spoon, and two small
packets of mayonnaise (T. 30-31).
Lt. Gray arrested Ms. Holmes for possession of a
controlled substance (T. 32). The officers released the driver of
the car.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Ms. Holmes was seized when officers stopped the car in
which she was a passenger for questioning as to whether she and the
driver had made a prostitution deal.
-4 -

Because the officers lacked a

reasonable suspicion to justify such detention, Ms. Holmes' rights
under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution were
violated and the evidence seized should have been suppressed.
The seizure of Ms. Holmes also violated her rights under
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the statutory
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended).
Even if the officers lawfully stopped the vehicle in
which Ms. Holmes was a passenger, the officers nevertheless violated
the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure when they seized a roll of paper towels which were not
visibly linked to criminal activity, and unrolled them without
obtaining a warrant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE DETENTION OF MS. HOLMES VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
The Court in Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968), referred

to the Fourth Amendment's personal privacy and security safeguards
as "sacred," with no right "more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
-5 -

control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."
Id., at 8-9 [quoting Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250 (1891)].

The protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment

extends to this nation's citizens when they are on public sidewalks
and when they are in their automobiles.

Delaware v. Prouse,

440

U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
A limited exception to the general probable cause
requirement was created by the United States Supreme Court in Terry
when it held that under appropriate circumstances a brief detention
of a person, absent probable cause to arrest, is permissible under
the Fourth Amendment.
(1983).

See also, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491

The Terry Court instructs that this limited exception is

tailored to balance the government's interest in effective law
enforcement against the individual's liberty, privacy and personal
security.

However, in recognizing the essential protections

guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has stressed
that in balancing these competing considerations, a central concern
has been "to assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the
unfettered discretion of officers in the field."

Brown v. Texas,

443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
Thus, in justifying a particular detention, an officer
must be able to point to specific articulable facts which, when
viewed under an objective standard, create a reasonable suspicion
-6 -

that the defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491.
This Court has reiterated the Terry Court's insistence on such a
standard, cautioning that "[a]nything less would invite intrusions
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has
consistently refused to sanction.

And simple 'good faith on the

part of the arresting officer is not enough....".

State v.

Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
at 21-22).

This constitutionally mandated "reasonable suspicion"

necessary to justify detention has been codified in Utah law at
Section 77-7-15 Utah Code Ann. (1953).

Trujillo,, 739 P.2d at 88.

The search and seizure limitations of the Fourth
Amendment apply to "investigatory stops" or "seizures" that are less
than official arrests.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17.

The Utah Supreme

Court has held that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of
its occupants constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments.

State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123

(Utah 1983); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653.

Therefore, Defendant Charlene

Holmes' fourth amendment rights were implicated when Officers Gray
and Shelton stopped the car in which she was a passenger and
detained her.

In this case, the information relied on by the

officers in a decision to detain the defendant did not amount to the
constitutionally mandated reasonable suspicion.
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It is Sergeant Shelton's testimony that he relied on four
factors to justify a stop and detention of Charlene Holmes,
1.

The officers observed Ms. Holmes on the block of 1200

South State Street which, they believed based on their past
experience, is part of a very high area of prostitution extending
from approximately 800 South to 2100 South on State Street.
2.

Ms. Holmes strolled at a very slow pace and turned

back to look toward traffic.
3.

Ms. Holmes had short, brief conversations with three

different males who were seated in their respective automobiles and
then got into one of the automobiles.
4.

The "suspicious" route of the car in which Ms. Holmes

was a passenger.
It is Sergeant Sheltonfs testimony that he relied on two
factors to justify the stop and detention of Charlene Holmes.
(a)

Ms. Holmes was in an area frequented by

(b)

Ms. Holmes talked briefly to two different males

prostitutes.

in their automobiles on two separate occasions, and she conversed
briefly with a third male in whose car she was subsequently stopped
and detained by the officers.
The factors enumerated by the officers, singly or in
combination, did not rise to the level indicated in the case law
from Utah, the United States Supreme Court, and other jurisdictions,
to justify the detention of Ms. Holmes under the fourth amendment.
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Factor 1(a). Both officers testified that they took an
interest in Charlene Holmes because of their belief that the area in
which they first observed her was a "very high prostitution area."
Although there has been little opportunity to analyze the
"high prostitution area" factor in Utah case law, it is most
analogous to the "high crime area" factor which was recently
presented to this Court in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App.
1987).

In Trujillo, this Court determined that an officer's

decision to stop the defendant was based initially on two factors,
one of which was the high crime factor in the area.

This Court held

that the seizure of the defendant was unconstitutional —

the

detention of the defendant being unreasonable within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.
In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), the
officer cited the "high crime area" factor as one of the bases for
his suspicion of criminal behavior on the part of the defendants.
The Utah Supreme Court's per curiam decision did not address the
issue specifically, but since the Court held that the information
known to the officer did not justify the stop, it can be inferred
that the high crime area factor was insufficient to justify the
challenged stop.

See also State v. Belanger, 677 P.2d 781 (Wash.

App. 1984).
In State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the
defendants were seen in a laundromat located in a high crime area at
1:00 a.m.

The officer recognized the defendants from a previous
-9 -

criminal encounter during which a bag of coins was discovered in
their possession.

In this instance, the Court found the initial

stop leading to the arrest as valid.

However, Whittenback is

readily distinguishable from the case now before the Court since the
officer had previously apprehended the defendants with a bag of
coins in their possession and there had been a rash of burglaries in
the area of the laundromat.
In the case now before the Court, no such previous
contact existed.

Sergeant Shelton testified that he had not had any

previous contacts with Ms. Holmes and that as the head of the vice
squad, he had no information that she was a prostitute (T.17).
Consequently, there is no relationship established between Ms.
Holmes1 prior activities and her presence in a "high prostitution
area."
In People v. Bower, 24 Cal.3d 638, 645, 597 P.2d 115, 119
(Cal. 1979), the California Supreme Court in addressing the "high
crime area" factor recognized that many citizens shop, work, play,
transact business, visit, or live in areas that have high crime
rates.

The Court noted that

p

[t]he spectrum of legitimate human

behavior occurs every day in so-called high crime areas.

As a

result, this court has appraised this factor with caution and has
been reluctant to conclude that a location's crime rate transforms
otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances
justifying the seizure of an individual."
omitted).

Ld.

(citations

The court's critical analysis of the high crime area
-10-

factor is consistent with the view that the attributes of a general
social phenomena should not be imputed to an individual.
in State v. Sery, Case No. 860333-CA, slip op., (July 27,
1988) this Court analogized Mr. Seryfs arrival from Florida as a
basis for a reasonable suspicion to the testimony in State v.
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), that Interstate 15 was often used
by illegal aliens from Mexico. ]M. at 18.

This Court found that

the fact that a person embarked from a flight which originated in
Florida did not amount to an objective fact upon which a reasonable
suspicion could be based just as the fact that a person was
traveling on 1-15 did not support a reasonable suspicion in
Mendoza.

This Court noted:
In Mendoza, the court considered it unlikely that
illegal alien transporters comprised a significant
portion of 1-15 traffic. It seems equally unlikely that
drug couriers comprise a significant portion of the
travelers through Salt Lake International airport,
even of those whose flight originated in Florida.

Id. at 18.

Applying the analysis of Mendoza and Sery to the instant

case, it seems just as unlikely that persons who have entered into
illegal prostitution agreements comprise a significant portion of
the people on State Street, and information that a woman was walking
on State Street between 2100 South and 800 South is not a fact upon
which a constitutionally sound reasonable suspicion that a woman was
involved in criminal activity could be based.
In the case before the Court, the defendant, a female,
was walking down the street in an area deemed by Officers Shelton
-11-

and Gray to be a "very high prostitution area"; an area, as
described by the officers, which encompasses approximately fifteen
city blocks, daily the site of heavy pedestrian and automobile
traffic.

A woman should not be subject to seizure simply because

she is present in an area which has a high incidence of
prostitution.

That an area has a high occurrence of prostitution

does not qualify itself as a specific articulable fact imputing a
reasonable suspicion of criminality to an individual woman.
Factor 2.

Sergeant Shelton alone testified that the

defendant's walk and accompanying backward glance were significant
factors in his decision to stop and detain her.

The allegedly

suspicious walk of Ms. Holmes was no more than her walking at a very
slow pace, or "strolling" and looking back towards traffic —

as

described by Sergeant Shelton. (T.21)
Although this Court has "acknowledged] that a trained
law enforcement officer may be able to perceive and articulate
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the
untrained observer," and furthermore, "[t]he officer is entitled to
assess the facts in light of his experience."
88-89; United States v. Mendenhall,

Trujillo, 739 P.2d at

446 U.S. 544, 564-565 (1980),

this Court has also re-emphasized that it is "imperative that the
facts be judged against an objective standard! ]" which would
•warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the
action taken was appropriate!.]" Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88. (Emphasis
added.)
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Sergeant Sheltonfs interpretation of Ms. Holmes' walk and
alleged head movements is purely subjective.

There is no objective

standard which one could possibly utilize to determine whether one
was strolling, walking at a very slow pace, at just a slow pace, at
a slow pace, at a medium pace, at a fast pace.

Assuming arguendo

that there is probative value in such a determination, it would fail
the objective test as enunciated by the Terry Court and followed by
this Court.
Indeed, the subjective nature of Sergeant Shelton's
observation of Ms. Holmes' walk and the conclusions derived
therefrom, is illustrated by the testimony of his partner that
evening.

Lieutenant Gray stated that although in his opinion she

walked a little slowly, there was otherwise nothing unusual about
her walk.

The following exchange occurred during cross-examination

of Lieutenant Gray:
Q.

Did you see her (Ms. Holmes) walk down State Street?

A.

Yes

Q.

Did she walk in a normal fashion?

A.

She walked a little slow, in my opinion, but
other than that, nothing unusual.

(T.35)

Q.

Okay, no flirting gestures?

A.

Not that I observed.

Lieutenant Gray's opinion that there was nothing unusual

about Ms. Holmes' walk and his lack of reliance on the manner in
which Ms.Holmes walked down the street to justify the determination
-13-

to stop and detain Ms. Holmes is strengthened by his twenty years
experience in police work.
The unordinary "pace" and "meaning" of Ms. Holmes' walk
is entirely subjective and not an objective indication of criminal
intent to be used to justify police detention.

To find otherwise

could conceivably subject every law-abiding citizen to the
"unfettered discretion" of law enforcement officials, in violation
of the fourth amendment.
Factor 3b.

Both officers testified that their interest

in Ms. Holmes was aroused because they observed her having short,
brief conversations with three different males seated in their
respective automobiles and that Ms. Holmes got into one of the
automobiles.
Ms. Holmes' "brief conversations" as a basis for the
formation of an articulable suspicion on the officers' part is
similarly subject to the objective difficulties discussed above.

As

to these brief conversations, Sergeant Shelton testified that as Ms.
Holmes walked down the street, three separate cars pulled up
alongside her and they briefly conversed.

Sergeant Shelton

testified in regard to these conversations that Ms. Holmes did not
motion to any car or wave the cars over; Ms. Holmes did not yell at
the cars; nor did they observe Ms. Holmes initiate the
conversations.

(T. 18-20).

Sergeant Shelton further testified that he could not hear
anything that was said in the conversations;
-14-

he did not know the

identity of Ms. Holmes or the identity of any of the three different
drivers; he did not know what occurred in the conversations prior to
Ms. Holmes1 ride in the car.

Jjd.

The result is that the officers

lacked an objective basis to formulate an articulable suspicion
arising from separate conversations between four unknown
individuals.

According to the officers1 testimony, at no time did

they possess any knowledge as to the purpose, context, or content of
the conversations "observed" between Charlene Holmes and the three
individuals.
Ms. Holmes was engaged in short conversations with three
men in cars as she walked down State Street, an occurrence which is
not at all peculiar as pointed out by Sergeant Shelton during
cross-examination:
Q.

You [Sergeant Shelton] have driven up and down
State Street a number of times, I take it?

A.

A lot, yes.

Q.

It is not unusual at all on any night of the
week to see a young woman talking to other
people in cars, is it?

A.

No.

Q.

Happens hundreds of times from 3rd South to 21st
South on State Street every night of the week?

A.

I canft talk about 21st to 3rd.

I am not really

that familiar with that part of the street.
is out of my jurisdiction.
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That

Q.

Well, within your jurisdiction, whatever that is.
It is the kind of thing that happens hundreds of
times a night on State Street, does it not?

A.

Yes, it does.

(T. 20-21)
Objectively, there is nothing to distinguish the brief
moments of conversation between the defendant and the three drivers
from "the kind of thing that happens hundred of times a night on
State Street."

(Jj3.)

The fourth amendment acts essentially as a

standard of "reasonableness" in order to guard "the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions" by government
officials, including law enforcement agents.

Prouse, 440 U.S. at

653-654.
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 52, the Court concluded
that there were no adequate grounds to form a reasonable suspicion
that the defendant was engaged in criminal conduct because, "[i]n
short, the [defendant's] activity was no different from the activity
of other pedestrians in that neighborhood."
P.2d at 90.

^IcJ.;

See Trujillo, 739

There was no knowledge provided to the officers from

Ms. Holmes' alleged conversations by which one could reasonably
differentiate Ms. Holmes from other pedestrians in the area.
Evaluated under an objective test, the alleged conversations between
Ms. Holmes and the three drivers do not give rise to a reasonable
suspicion.
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Sergeant Shelton stated that the route taken by the car
in which Ms. Holmes was a passenger contributed to his decision to
stop the vehicle and detain the passengers.

Sergeant Shelton

testified that the car's route also included momentarily pulling
into two different parking lots.

Sergeant Shelton further testified

that he did not observe the car make any traffic violations (T.
22).

On the other hand, Lieutenant Gray's testimony did not specify

that the route of the automobile in question was relied upon by him
to justify the stop and detention of Ms. Holmes (T. 29, 36-37).
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674
(Utah 1986) was presented with the stop of an automobile in which
one of the factors claimed to justify the stop and detention was the
manner in which the car was driven.

The officer observed the slow

moving car, with out-of-state license plates at 3:00 a.m. in an area
in which a recent rash of burglaries had occurred.

The Court's

analysis took into account the fact that the officer had not
observed any criminal or traffic offense while he followed the car
for three blocks.

It was the Court's finding that the officer had

no objective facts on which to base a reasonable suspicion that the
car's two occupants were involved in criminal activity.
In State v. Mendoza,

748 P.2d 181 (Utah, 1987), the Utah

Supreme Court directly addressed the "route of travel" factor
stating that "it had little probative value in determining if the
officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle."
4.

La.

at

Furthermore, the Court noted that the "erratic driving behavior"
-17-

(the subsequent lane change and rapid deceleration at the approach
of the patrol car) could not be interpreted to give rise to a
suspicion that the occupants of the car were engaged in illegal
activity,

jr_d. at 4-5.
In Sery, the Court compared the State's reliance on Mr.

Sery's behavior in sitting down in a phone booth twice then standing
up and looking over the partition, and subsequently leaving the
booth by a "strange" path to the State's reliance on an "erratic"
driving pattern in Mendoza.

Sery, slip. op. at 19.

This Court

determined that Mr. Sery's behavior did not amount to an objective
fact upon which a reasonable suspicion could be based, pointing out
that the officer "did not say how this behavior varies from that of
any other arriving

passenger . . .". Id.

In the present case, the officers observed the car in
which Ms. Holmes was a passenger in an area of heavy traffic.
Neither officer observed any criminal behavior before or after the
car turned from the south bound direction on State Street to the
north bound direction on State Street when they stopped the car.
The officers did not articulate any objective facts to support the
speculation that the manner in which the car was driven served to
provide a reasonable suspicion that a "prostitution deal" had been
made between Ms. Holmes and the driver of the car or that the car
was driven any differently from other cars cruising State Street. In
fact, Sergeant Shelton testified the he pulled the car over because
he "figured" that a prostitution deal had been made and that the
-18-

driver had decided that they were police and he was going to return
and drop off Ms. Holmes.

Sergeant Shelton acknowledged that his

scenario was conjecture on his part (T. 10).

In addition the car

was unmarked and the officers were in plain clothes suggesting it
was difficult for the occupants of the car to have known they were
being followed by officers if, in fact, they realized that they were
being followed at all.*

Furthermore, it is indicative of the nature

of the stop that the officers released the driver without getting
his name, the

model and make of the car, and the license plate

number (T. 24).
The four factors relied upon by the officers to justify
the stop and detention of Ms. Holmes, when analyzed singly, do not
constitute specific articulable facts which create a reasonable
suspicion that a crime had taken place or was about to take place.
Furthermore, nothing concerning the cumulation of the factors makes
them more persuasive in support of a conclusion that the officers'
suspicion was reasonable under the fourth amendment.

The specified

factors do not "mysteriously become imbued with an aura of guilt
merely by viewing them in their totality.
arithmetic, still equals zero."

Four times zero, in

People v. Loewen 35 Cal.3d 117, 672

P.2d 436, 444 (Cal. 1983) (quoting People v. Gale

9 Cal. 3d 788,

511 P.2d 1204 (Cal. 1973) (dis.opn. of Mosk, J.))

1

The State offered no testimony that either Ms. Holmes
or the driver turned around to look at them or repeatedly checked
the rear view mirror.
-19-

Because the officers' detention of Ms. Holmes was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, the
detention violated the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution.

It is well settled that when the seizure and

detention of the defendant is without the evidentiary justification
required by the fourth amendment of the Constitution, the resulting
evidence from the misconduct must be excluded from criminal trials.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.

See also Trujillo,

739 P.2d. 85 Utah App.

1988).
Accordingly, the evidence obtained from Ms. Holmes should
have been suppressed.

Ms. Holmes respectfully requests that such

evidence be suppressed, her conviction reversed, and the matter
remanded for dismissal or a new trial without the illegally seized
evidence.

POINT II.

THE DETENTION OF MS. HOLMES VIOLATED
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.

Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah is free to analyze search and seizure cases under
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution differently from case
-20-

law which is based on an interpretation of the fourth amendment to
the United States constitution.

In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127

(Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court inferred that a separate
analysis of search and seizure cases under the Utah Constitution,
article I, section 14 is warranted.

Ijd* at 129 n.l.

See also State

v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986).
In State v. Myrick, 688 P.2d 151, 153 (Wash. 1984), the
Washington Supreme Court characterized the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the federal constitution as "guidance" in
construing the Washington Constitution.

The Myrick Court stated

that, "[w]hile we may turn to the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the United States Constitution for guidance in establishing a
hierarchy of values and principles under the Washington
Constitution, we rely, in the final analysis, upon our own legal
foundations in determining its scope and effect."

Id.

Illustratively, the Washington Supreme Court found that the
Washington Constitution provided greater protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures by police to the people of
Washington than did the federal constitution.

State v. Jackson, 688

P.2d 136, 143 (Wash. 1984).
Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that it
should "construe Alaska's constitutional provisions such as Article
I, Section 14 as affording additional rights to those granted by the
United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution,"
v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska 1985).
-21-

State

In Jones, the Court

approved a more rigorous test to determine probable cause under
Alaska law than is required under the federal constitution.
Assuming arguendo that the factors relied upon by the
officers supported a detention of Ms, Holmes not in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution, this Court may
impose a more rigorous test to determine what constitutes reasonable
suspicion under the Utah constitution.

The facts of the present

case should not support a justifiable intrusion of the protections
granted to Ms. Holmes under article I, section 14 of the Utah
constitution and thus the evidence that flowed from the unlawful
seizure should have been suppressed.

POINT III. EVEN IF THE STOP WERE LAWFUL, THE OFFICERS
VIOLATED MS. HOLMES' RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND
SEIZURE WHEN THEY SEIZED THE ROLL OF PAPER TOWELS AND
UNWRAPPED IT.
Assuming arguendo that the officers made a rightful stop
and that consequently Lieutenant Gray was in a position where he was
entitled to be, evidence obtained was nevertheless the result of an
illegal search and seizure.
in State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court held that "warrantless seizures and searches are per
se unreasonable unless the exigencies of the situation justify
exception."
(1967);

an

JLd. at 123, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347

see also State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983); State

v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981).

One exception specified by the
-22-

Cole Court to the warrant requirement is the doctrine that "objects
within the plain view of an officer from a position where he is
entitled to be are not the subject of an
unlawful search."

Cole, 674 P.2d at 123 [citations omitted].

The "plain view doctrine" requires (1) lawful presence of
the officer which is incident to a lawful intrusion; (2) evidence
which is in plain view; and (3) evidence which is clearly
incriminating.

State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986); State

v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983).

The Kelly Court further

explained that the third requirement that evidence be "clearly
incriminating" means that there is "probable cause to associate the
property with criminal activity."

Kelly, 718 P.2d at 390 (quoting

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-742 (1983) (plurality opinion)).
Probable cause requires that an officer "have a reasonable belief
that the object viewed may be contraband or stolen property or
useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that
such a belief be correct. . . " Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742.
The object viewed by Lieutenant Gray consisted of a roll
of paper towels (T. 31). In his testimony, Lieutenant Gray attached
special significance to the paper towels and a roll of paper towels
alone does not provide probable cause to associate the towels with
criminal behavior.

The only basis for a finding that the paper

towels were "clearly incriminating evidence" provided by Lieutenant
Gray to justify his seizure was that he "felt she (Ms. Holmes) was
attempting to hide something from us."
-23-

.Id. The inference from the

officer's testimony is that the paper towels became "clearly
incriminating evidence" from his observation of Ms. Holmes removing
the towels from her purse and "stuffing" them between a console and
the car sear (T. 30).
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), this
Court examined a "furtive movement" subsequent to the approach of a
police officer.

In Trujillo, the officer saw the defendant shift

his knapsack from his side to his front in a way considered by the
officer to be an effort of concealment.

When the officer

approached, the defendant placed the knapsack next to a garbage can,
an act which the officer regarded as an effort to "stash" the
knapsack.
This Court noted that the officer did not observe Mr.
Trujillo engage in any criminal conduct nor did the officer inquire
about the "suspicious" placement of the knapsack before subjecting
Mr. Trujillo to the search which yielded a concealed weapon.
Furthermore, this Court pointed out that the officer never
articulated what concerned him about the knapsack.

Ij3.

at 86-89.

In the present case, the officers did not observe Ms.
Holmes engage in any criminal conduct, nor did Lieutenant Gray
inquire about the "suspicious" placement of the paper towels before
reaching inside the car and taking them.
Trujillo,

Similar to the facts of

the officer only articulated a suspicion that Ms. Holmes

was "attempting to hide something from us" to justify the seizure
and search of the paper towels (T. 31).

-24-

The United States Supreme Courtfs opinion in Texas v.
Brown 460 U.S. 730 (1983), suggests that an officer must articulate
more than a subjective interpretation of a furtive movement in order
to justify a seizure.

In Brown, the officer testified that his

seizure of a balloon from the defendant was based on his knowledge
that balloons tied in the manner of the one seized were frequently
used to carry narcotics.

The officer's testimony of illicit drug

practices was corroborated by a police department chemist.

In

addition, the seizure was based on other contents of the car which
further suggested possession of illicit substances.
742-743.

Ij3. at

In the instant case, where the visible item itself was not

tied to criminal activity and the officer articulated only a
subjective interpretation of an action, the seizure of the roll of
paper towels and all articles within was not justified.
Assuming arguendo that the seizure of the rolled up paper
towel was legal, the officer effected an illegal search by unrolling
the paper towels on the roof of the car in order to ascertain its
contents.

A closed container may not be opened without a warrant,

even when the container is in plain view and the officer has
probable cause to believe contraband is concealed within.

United

States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In his concurrence in Brown,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stevens wrote:
"if there is probable cause to believe it
contains contraband, the owner's possesory
interest in the container must yield to
society's interest in making sure that the
contraband does not vanish during the time
-25-

it would take to obtain a warrant. The item
may be seized temporarily. It does not follow,
howeverf that the container may be opened on
the spot. Once the container is in custody,
there is no risk that evidence will be destroyed
Some inconvenience to the officer is entailed
by requiring him to obtain a warrant before
opening the container, but that alone does not
excuse the duty to go before a neutral magistrate.
(Emphasis added.)
Brown, 460 U.S. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Nor do the contents of the rolled paper towel in the
present case fall within the distinctive configuration variation of
the plain view doctrine.

Pursuant to the "distinctive configuration

variation" the contents of a container are considered to be within
the searching officer's view because the distinctive configuration
of the container proclaims its contents.

State v. Cole, 674 P.2d

119, 124 (Utah 1983); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
The Cole Court found that a gun case inferred its contents due to
its distinctive configuration.

Cole, 674 P.2d at 124; Arkansas v.

Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
The contents of the rolled paper towel could not be
ascertained by its configuration.

A rolled paper towel could

contain an infinite variety of items, if anything at all.

Thus, the

rolled paper towel does not invoke the distinctive configuration
variation of the plain view doctrine.

Therefore, Lieutenant Gray,

even if justified in the seizure of the paper towels, effected an
illegal search by not then obtaining a warrant to ascertain the

-26-

contents of the rolled towel as was within his power and which is
required by the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.
Accordingly, the evidence obtained from within the rolled
paper towels should be suppressed and Ms. Holmes requests that her
conviction be overturned and the case remanded for a new trial
absent the illegally seized evidence, or dismissal.

CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Holmes
requests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's
ruling on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial
court with an order to suppress the evidence, and dismiss the
charges or provide for a new trial without such evidence.

Respectfully submitted this

/ffi

day of August, 1988.

'JAJ^ES C. BRADSHAW
:orney for Defendant/Appellant

^dfc-C.ateX
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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